A Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment by Trujillo, Elizabeth
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2013
A Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment
Elizabeth Trujillo
Texas A&M University School of Law, etrujillo@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment, 16 J. Int'l Econ. L. 535 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/800
ADIALOGICALAPPROACHTOTRADE
ANDENVIRONMENT
Elizabeth Trujillo*
ABSTRACT
Traditionally, supporters of free trade and environmentalists have regarded
each other as the obstacle to development, and both sides have very different
views as to what constitutes development. This article considers the various
dimensions to international trade governance in the context of the environ-
ment and draws from the dialogic theory in comparative constitutional law to
frame trade governance regarding the environment in a new way. It uses a
dialogical approach to highlight primarily three characteristics of the inter-
national trade regime that has fostered enhanced cross-fertilization of trade
and environmental issues: (i) the adjudicatory capacity of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), (ii) the ad-
ministrative capacity of the WTO and PTAs, and (iii) the fragmentary nature
of trade governance. This approach highlights ways in which these three
dynamics have allowed for heightened ‘cross-fertilization’ of environmental
concerns into the trade framework, stimulating a form of transnational regu-
latory bargaining with respect to environmental issues vis-a`-vis trade that
reaches beyond the trade realm. Though a close look at these characteristics
also illuminates the important role of free trade more generally and the WTO
more specifically, in setting a normative vision of environmental sustainabil-
ity, it also shows that trade regimes are limited in setting a course for ad-
dressing sustainable development. In particular, free trade says little about
what constitutes sustainable development, especially when also faced with
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the different challenges for economic development in the developed and
developing countries.
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be
conducted with a view to . . . expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development . . .
Preamble, The WTO Agreement (April, 15, 1994)
I. INTRODUCTION
Concerns for the environment and sustainability can not be ignored, espe-
cially in the midst of so many crises of late: BP oil spill, Japan’s earthquake
and tsunami leading to a possible nuclear meltdown, rising ocean tempera-
tures, and climate change phenomena more generally. With the emerging
economies continuing to develop at significant speeds, international eco-
nomic institutions increasingly find themselves at the crossroads of economic
development and the preservation of natural resources. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) is once again at the forefront of the trade and envir-
onment interface with the recent three latest labeling cases: United States
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products;
United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes;
and US-Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL).1 Many have argued that
the WTO should expand its jurisdiction to deal with nontrade matters such
as the environment in more formal ways. Over the years, there have been
strides in this direction, with WTO adjudication of environmental regula-
tions and WTO committee work on trade and environment issues.2
The WTO has played both an administrative and adjudicatory function
with respect to trade matters and in turn, has become an agent of global
governance in this regard. The formal structure of the WTO, including its
dispute settlement bodies, has made it a natural focal point for those search-
ing for a global governing structure for trade and environmental issues. The
adjudicatory aspect of WTO panels, along with its binding Covered
Agreements setting up rules for trade, provides the WTO with a veil of
1 United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, 2
September 2011 (hereinafter, US – Clove Cigarettes); US-Certain Country of Origin Labeling
(COOL) (Canada), WT/DS384/8 and US-COOL (Mexico), WT/DS386/7.
2 Doha Agenda and Committee on Trade and Environment available at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm.
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legitimacy and formality that can not be ignored.3 Its adjudicatory capacity
enhances the legalization of the WTO.4 However, it is not only a source for
law-making processes concerning trade, but also acts as a catalyst for more
discourse and negotiation around economic development and environmental
sustainability, two concepts that are not easily compatible.
This article uses a dialogical approach to highlight the relevance of the
WTOs institutional framework, with its adjudicatory and administrative
functions,5 in fostering the cross-fertilization of trade and environmental
issues6 and the transference of related transnational norms across jurisdic-
tional lines and topical domains.7 The adjudicatory function of WTO panels,
for example, has fostered judicial ‘cross-fertilization’ of trade and environ-
mental issues and a convergence of the global and the domestic, as WTO
judges grapple with domestic environmental regulation.8
3 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of Legalization’, 54 International Organization 401
(2000) (recognizing that ‘legalization’ consists of (i) obligations of rules, (ii) the precision of
those rules in establishing conduct, and (iii) the delegation to third parties to interpret and/or
enforce the rules, but also is not necessarily separate from political bargaining).
4 See Beth Simmons, ‘The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs’, 53 International
Organization 573, 574 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601345 (with respect to the
IMF rules, stating that ‘legalization strengthens commitment. It is this quality that makes
formal treaty arrangements desirable in the first place’.).
5 This article, while recognizing that the adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory capacities of the
WTO may constitute part of a global administrative space, it separates out the two in order to
highlight the different functions and purposes of both areas for trade regulation. See Benedict
Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law’, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15 (2005), at 17 (providing a taxonomy for a
global administrative space that includes rule-making and administrative adjudication between
competing interests and regulatory and management within ‘administrative action’).
6 See Sungjoon Cho, ‘Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the
Entropic Dilemma’, 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 625 (2005), at 626 (discussing
the linkages between competing values of free trade and social regulation).
7 See Ruti Teitel, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age’, 117 Harvard Law Review
2570 (2004), at 2584–87 (discussing ‘the dialogical approach’ in comparative constitutionalism
as a contemporary means of grounding ‘comparativism . . . in the processes of judicial review’).
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, 44 Harvard International Law
Journal 191 (2003), at 193–94 (discussing ‘transnational litigation’ as consisting of domestic
and international tribunals that involves not only private parties but also cases between states,
and states and individuals as well as between individuals transnationally); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’, 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103 (2000)
(describing ‘judicial globalization’ as a process of transnational judicial interaction); Melissa
Waters, ‘Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in
Creating and Enforcing International Law’, 93 Georgetown Law Journal 487, 489–90 (pro-
posing that, primarily with regard to constitutional issues, ‘ ‘‘transnational judicial dialogue’’ is
the engine by which domestic courts collectively engage in the co-constitutive process of
creating and shaping international legal norms and, in turn, ensuring that those norms
shape and inform domestic courts’.).
8 See Ruti Teitel and Robert Howse, ‘Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but
Interconnected Global Order’, 7–12 (2011) (illustrating ways in which adjudication across
related but different jurisdictional capacities highlights a common value to which each siloed
area speaks to; that is, ‘humanity law’), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334289.
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A dialogic approach has been traditionally associated with judicial ‘dia-
logue’, as a means of framing the role of courts vis a` vis other branches
and levels of government.9 In this framework, courts not only interpret
laws, but also ‘engage’ with the work of other branches of government, for
example agencies in the context of administrative law.10 They have an on-
going dialogue with non-judicial actors and may even engage with other
comparable jurisprudence.11 In the international, dialogical approaches
have taken hold in better understanding the way in which international
courts interact with each other and with national courts.12 In particular, it
attempts to provide metaphorical framing for ‘judicial comity’, where unre-
lated courts may refer to one another’s decisions to assist them with new
problems of transnational appeal.13 In these ways, courts may foster
international reciprocity of international norms and enhance the ability of
these norms to travel across jurisdictional lines, even taking hold
domestically.14
While this article does not attempt to elaborate on the theory of a dia-
logic approach, it draws from key characteristics of this approach that are
applicable to framing trade governance regarding the environment in a new
way. First, a dialogic approach considers the ways in which different legal
norms interact.15 These interactions allow for cross-fertilization of trade and
non-trade issues. Second, a dialogic approach highlights the dynamic pro-
cess of the judiciary ‘engaging’ with non-judiciary actors.16 Trade dispute
settlement bodies have had to decide the viability of non-tariff trade barriers
under trade jurisprudence. This process has in fact forced trade adjudica-
tors into legal areas outside the trade scope, including environmental law
and domestic regulation. Such engagement has not only allowed for
9 See e.g. Jay Tidmarsh, ‘A Dialogic Defense of Alden’, 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1161
(2000), at 1163 (stating that a dialogic theory contends ‘perhaps counterintuitively, that the
fundamental constitutional role of each court system is to engage the other system in a dia-
logue about the extent and shape of the other system’s rights, obligations, and entitlements.’).
10 See also, Emily Hammond Meazell, ‘Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law’, 111
Columbia Law Review 1722 (2011), at 1734.
11 Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation’, 74 Indiana Law Journal 819 (1999), at 825–26.
12 See Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’, above n 7. See also, Robert Ahdieh, ‘Between
Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts’, 79 NYU Law Review
2029 (2004) (discussing Chapter 11 NAFTA investor-state disputes as containing elements
of ‘judicial dialogue and transnational comity’).
13 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Court to Court’, 92 American Journal of International Law 708
(1998), at 709–11.
14 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, 29 University of
Richmond Law Review 99 (1994), at 115–17 (discussing how transnational judicial commu-
nication can promote ‘reciprocal international obligations’).
15 See Ibid at 117–19 (proposing that transnational judicial communication allows for norms to
travel across legal systems and therefore, enhance cross-fertilization for dissimilar areas of the
law).
16 See Tidmarsh, above n 9.
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cross-fertilization, but also brought environmental policy into the same dis-
course of international trade in concrete ways; and in turn, impacted do-
mestic environmental policy and foreign policy.17 Third, a dialogic
approach provides a prism through which to see the various dimensions
of interactions between trade and environmental issues. In this approach,
there is no hierarchy per se in which to invoke various legal norms—a trade
dispute settlement body may consider legal norms in or outside of trade or
in other international treaties and international environmental communities
may be borrowed from trade norms.18 Because of the lack of hierarchy, the
fragmentation in trade adjudication becomes particularly relevant in under-
standing the ways in which environmental issues and trade cross-fertilize,
especially with respect to vertical and horizontal forms of judicial
engagement.19
While dialogical approaches tend to focus on the role of courts, this article
proposes that adjudication is only one aspect of cross-fertilization of trade
and environmental issues. The discursive and dynamic aspects of adjudica-
tion can also find their way into the administrative function of the WTO.
The workings of the Secretariat and its working groups and committees,
allows the administrative parts of the WTO to become a political forum
through which Member States may dialogue and reach agreement (or not)
on matters concerning trade and the environment.20 Furthermore, commit-
tee decisions may in fact influence treaty interpretations of dispute settle-
ment bodies, further impacting the ways in which trade and environmental
issues may converge.21 This dual capacity of the WTO not only reinforces its
institutional legitimacy with regard to nontrade areas impacting trade com-
pliance, but also ‘links’ non-trade interests with trade.22
A dialogical lens also illuminates the role of fragmentation, through re-
gional trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and El Mercado Comu´n del Sur (MERCOSUR) for example, in
‘linking’ environmental issues to trade and development. In most cases,
17 See Teitel, above n 7 at 2584–87; Waters, above n 7 at 489–90.
18 See Ahdieh, above n 12, at 2049 (explaining that one characteristic of a dialogical approach is
that it has ‘bidirectionality’; and therefore, any court may initiate dialogue and engage with
the jurisprudence of another).
19 Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 14 (exploring the com-
monalities in the various horizontal and vertical forms of communication among courts
transnationlly).
20 See Greg Shaffer, ‘The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the Law
and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environmental Matters’, 25 Harvard
Environmental Law Review 1–93 (2001) (in applying three alternative frames of the
WTO’s handling of trade and environmental issues, the author discusses the ‘intergovern-
mental perspective’ as one that allows states to bargain in the WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment and respond to various stakeholder interests).
21 See above Section IV.
22 See Jose Alvarez, ‘The WTO as Linkage Machine’, 96 American Journal of International
Law 146 (2002).
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disputing parties tend to adjudicate trade and environment disputes at the
multilateral level rather than the regional.23 This multi-level dynamic has
also impacted the way in which trade and environmental issues have con-
verged. Furthermore, global institutional frameworks are only one form of
global governance. Soft law norms, through the workings of state and non-
state actors, contribute to the dynamism of modern global governance in
which organic processes facilitate the furtherance of specific goals.24 The
transnational processes arising from these relationships and law-making
mechanisms form part of the relationship between trade and environmental
concerns. Public and private partnerships involved in the development and
implementation of regulatory policy bring new sets of issues to the trade and
environment discourse.
Despite a broadening of the influence of trade norms into other legal
domains like the environment, collision may arise among the application of
rules in these various domains and among the normative goals that each is
attempting to achieve.25 This article uses a dialogical approach not only to
demonstrate the ways in which the relationship has evolved and transformed
the WTOs jurisdictional scope to incorporate environmental concerns, but
also to highlight that it is within the contestation of trade goals with those of
environmental sustainability that new ways of thinking about the relationship
may emerge, allowing for possible shifts in the normative objectives of either
domain while considering the multilateral, regional, and domestic aspects.26
Section II of this article will provide an overview of the ways in which a
dialogical approach to trade and environmental issues frames the relationship
in a new way. Section III will look closely at the adjudicatory function of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO panels and
focus on provisions of the GATT itself most closely tied to environmental
matters. Section IV of this article will consider the administrative capacity of
23 See e.g. United States – Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products WT/CS381/R (Panel Report) (15 September 2011) (hereinafter US – Tuna
Panel Report); United States – Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products WT/DS381/AB/R (Appellate Brief) (16 May 2012) (hereinafter US
– Tuna II AB).
24 David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P.
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global
Governance (2009), at 37, 40 (urging us to ‘think about global governance as a dynamic
process in which legal, political, and economic arrangements unleash interests, change the
balance of forces, and lead to further reinvention of the governance scheme itself’’).
25 See Gunther Teubner and Peter Korth, ‘Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of
Transnational Regimes in the Double Fragmentation of World Society’, in Margaret A.
Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
26 See Ibid at 29 (discussing that a collision of legal acts and norms characterizes ‘post-modern
interlegality’ which does not give rise to ‘a single ‘‘ultimate rule of recognition’’ and that
‘[n]either a hierarchical construction of the law nor a Grundnorm nor a common point of
final reference can hold these heterachical systems together’).
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trade regimes, including those found in preferential trade agreements
(PTAs), and considers the relationship of PTAs to the multilateral trade
framework. Section V of this article discusses the dialogical impacts of frag-
mentation in trade governance; despite some convergence between trade and
environment, there continues to be fragmentation.27 Finally, this article iden-
tifies how the dialogical dynamics of the adjudicatory and administrative
functions of trade regimes have developed into a more robust discourse on
the connections among trade, economic development, and environmental
sustainability. ‘Green’ economic strategies, with the participation of both
state and non-state actors, are the wave of the future, raising questions as
to whether trade regimes can adapt to accommodate for environmental
goods and services. The article concludes with reflections on the lessons
that a dialogical approach to trade and the environment provides on better
understanding the relationship today.
II. A DIALOGICAL APPROACH
A dialogical approach highlights the effects of transnationalism on trade.28 A
dialogic theory has been applied to US constitutional law to understand the
interactions between federal and state courts, and among the various
branches of government.29 Despite its limitations,30 a dialogic approach
highlights jurisdictional overlaps and emphasizes the interaction among
27 But see, Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Fragmentation and Coherence in International Law’, (2011)
draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908862.
28 See Harold Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, 75 Nebraska Law Review 181 (1996), at
183–84 (discussing the nature of transnational legal processes as being at the core of inter-
national law and explaining that the ‘transnational legal process describes the theory and
practice of how public and private actors—nation-states, international organizations, multi-
national enterprise, non-governmental organizations, and private individuals—interact in a
variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce,
and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law’).
29 See e.g. Tidmarsh, above n 9, at 1163 (stating that a dialogic theory ‘contends, perhaps
counterintuitively, that the fundamental constitutional role of each court system is to
engage the other system in a dialogue about the extent and shape of the other system’s
rights, obligations, and entitlements’.). See also, Martin Redish, ‘Supreme Court Review of
State Court ‘‘Federal’’ Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism’, 19 Georgia Law Review
861 (1985) (describing the ‘interactive’ aspects of federal and state courts as dialogic); and
Barry Friedman, ‘A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction’, 85 Northwestern Law Review 1 (1990) (focusing on the value of dialogue
among various branches of government).
30 See Tidmarsh, above n 9, at 1168–70 (explaining the limits of a dialogic theory as falling
primarily into three categories: (i) the need for an ultimate arbiter of legal questions, (ii)
efficiency based limitations focusing on the need for certain barriers to dialogue based on
which courts should decide certain legal questions, and (iii) limits to dialogue based on
constitutional concerns such as separation of powers and federalism).
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courts and branches of government, thereby revealing the use of multiple
centers for legal-decision making.31
A dialogic approach has also been expanded into the comparative and trans-
national realms, where it animates the work of scholars who examine the inter-
action among national and foreign courts.32 It highlights that the various forms
of ‘transjudicial communication’ can result in enhancing the effectiveness of
supranational tribunals, promoting acceptance of reciprocal international obli-
gations, enhancing cross-fertilization, and collective deliberation by courts on a
common set of problems.33 Cross-fertilization refers to the ‘dissemination of
ideas from one national legal system to another, from one regional legal system
to another, or from the international legal system or a particular regional legal
system to national legal systems’.34 The fact that certain norms may cross
jurisdictional barriers is very telling of the ways in which courts ‘communicate’,
either directly or indirectly, with one another on issues of mutual concern.
Although this article is not intended to provide an overview nor an analysis
of the dialogic theory, it finds the dialogic approach helpful in bringing new
perspectives to the interplay of trade issues with those of the environment.
While a dialogical approach is grounded in constitutionalism, this article uses
this approach to provide important insights into the functionality of the
WTOs adjudicatory and administrative capacities in linking trade to the en-
vironment.35 Though some scholars will argue that the WTO is not the
correct forum to deal with nontrade issues such as the environment,36 this
article does not make a normative claim in this regard one way or another.
Instead, it takes a positivist approach, noting points where trade and envir-
onmental issues have already cross-fertilized and using the dialogic theory to
illuminate the ways these important links have evolved over time.
A dialogic approach traditionally focuses on judicial ‘dialogue’.37 In this
article, however, the dialogical approach moves beyond the adjudicatory as a
31 See ibid. See also, Alexandra D. Lahav, ‘Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional
Redundancy’, 82 Tulane Law Review 2369 (2008), 2370–72 (discussing multi-centered
litigation and concluding that ‘jurisdictional redundancy’, as first espoused by Robert M.
Cover, furthers the values of legal pluralism).
32 See e.g. above nn 5,7,12–14.
33 See Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 14, 17, at 114–22.
34 Ibid at 117.
35 See Teitel, above n 7.
36 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘The Death of the Trade Regime’, 10 European Journal of
International Law 733 (1999) (arguing that the political nature of linkage disputes makes
them unfit for adjudication the WTO system); John H. Jackson, ‘Dispute Settlement and
WTO: Emerging Problems’, 3 Journal of International Law 35 (1998) (finding that the WTO
system may deal with some linkage issues but through the legal disciplines built into the WTO
Covered Agreements). But see, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Multi-level Trade Governance in
the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism’, in C. Joerges and E. U. Petersmann (eds),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (2006), at 22 (arguing that
the WTO system should be used to advance human rights).
37 See Tidmarsh, above n 9.
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means for dialogue. The administrative functions of the WTO also play an
important role in not only reinforcing the adjudicatory, but also in initiating
dialogue with nontrade stakeholders. This dual dynamic contributes in
expanding the scope of trade institutions from a purely trade regulatory
framework defined by its treaties and enforcement mechanisms.
This article focuses on three dialogical aspects to the trade and environ-
ment dichotomy. First, the internal legal frameworks of the WTO, supported
by the GATT and Covered Agreements, provide a space under which the
adjudicatory processes of the WTO may consider trade and nontrade mat-
ters, including specifically issues concerning environmental regulation. WTO
jurisprudence, arising from its adjudicatory function has impacted environ-
mental regulation over time. Furthermore, judicial discretion, through treaty
interpretation by WTO panelists and judges, plays a key role in the devel-
opment of this jurisprudence, also impacting the way that environmental
concerns cross fertilize into the trade regime.
Second, the administrative capacity of the WTO, through its Secretariat
and Committees, fosters enhanced dialogue between trade and environmen-
tal stakeholders. The 1994 mandate for the WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE), for example, was to identify the relationship between
trade measures and environmental ones to promote sustainable development
and to make recommendations in this regard. The 2001 Doha Declaration
asked the CTE to work on specific areas concerning trade and environment;
including, ‘green protectionism’, relevant TRIPS provisions, labeling require-
ments, and special rules for environmental goods and services. Furthermore,
in light of the current impasse on the Doha Round, the Secretariat has found
other means of bringing trade and nontrade stakeholders together to discuss
matters of common interest.
Third, a dialogical approach provides a prism through which to see frag-
mentation in the trade system and ways that this has contributed to the cross
fertilization of trade and environmental issues. As trade policy has expanded
among nations, the multiplicity of jurisdictional regimes in the trading
system itself has provided for various opportunities for dialogue among
free traders and environmentalists, either through the adjudicatory processes
in those regional and bilateral arrangements, or through the negotiations and
working groups under those agreements dealing with these matters.
Furthermore, as a result of increasing fragmentation, trade regimes continu-
ally interact with nontrade regimes, also contributing to cross fertilization.
These points of intersection have varying degrees of impact, from formal
forms of cross fertilization, where treaties recognize the trade and environ-
ment relationship (such as regional trade agreements) to less tangible forms
of convergence where different adjudicatory fora may have jurisdiction over
the same dispute (like Chile-Swordfish). In addition, fragmentation provides
room for less formal means of cross fertilization, where transnational
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regulatory norms emerge and ‘greening the economy’ becomes the currency
for sustainable policies.38 In this context, the institutional framework of the
WTO may become a focal point for various public and private actors to
discuss and establish transnational norms that impact environmental issues
and trade ones.
III. ADJUDICATORY CAPACITY OF THE WTO
The internal adjudicatory framework of the multilateral trade regime has
allowed for a judicial ‘dialogue’ between the interests of the environmental
and trade communities, where domestic environmental regulations have col-
lided with trade compliance. This interaction first occurred under the pro-
visions of the GATT itself. The interplay between Articles III and XX for
example provides adjudicatory panels with a legal framework upon which to
deal with environmental measures that may be legitimate either because they
pass the muster of national treatment requirements under Article III or be-
cause they form an exception under Article XX.39 Article XX can be invoked
as a defense to alleged violations of Article III as long as the measures are
not applied ‘as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’.40
Furthermore, WTO panels established relevant jurisprudence on interpreting
these provisions in the context domestic environmental regulations and with
respect to issues related to the environmental effects of the life cycle of a
product, known as Product Production Methods (PPMs). These types of
internal dialogical interfaces have occurred within the single treaty of the
GATT.
After 1994, the multilateral trade legal framework incorporated new agree-
ments beyond the GATT to constitute the WTO Covered Agreements.41
Among those included were two that specifically dealt with regulations con-
cerning health and safety of a state’s population, animals, and environment;
namely, the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreements (SPS).42 These agreements provide for domestic
regulatory agencies to conduct domestic risk assessment to determine the
38 See below Section VI.
39 Robert Hudec, GATT/WTO ‘Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘Aims and
Effects’ Test’, The International Lawyer 32 (1998), at 619–49.
40 GATT Article XX, Chapeau.
41 See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, app. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
42 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 15 Aprril 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A (hereinafter, TBT Agreement), and. Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement, 15 April 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A (hereinafter, SPS agreement).
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necessity of certain regulatory measures as compared to the costs on free
trade. The TBT and the SPS Agreements both give heightened legitimacy to
regulations in compliance with international standards, but do not define
clearly what international standards may pass muster or what constitutes a
recognized ‘international standardizing body’.43
In the establishment of these agreements, WTO panels are capable of
taking a more formal adjudicatory approach in dealing with nontariff barriers
while recognizing the sovereign right of Member States to implement
domestic regulatory policy. Furthermore, WTO panels have been ‘rule-
oriented’, abiding by the interpretation principles of the Vienna
Convention and being cautious about looking beyond the Covered
Agreements to interpret the GATT.44 These ‘formal’ approaches within
the confines of WTO adjudication have contributed to the legitimacy of
the WTO and its governing for matters of trade regulation.
A. Early trade and environment cases and their effects on US
environmental regulation
1. US-Tuna I
With United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, the tension between
environmentalists and free trader began to take hold.45 In US-Tuna I,
Mexico alleged that a US moratorium on imports of Mexican yellowfin
tuna through the implementation of the US Marine Mammal Protection
Act violated general prohibition of quantitative restrictions under Article XI
of the GATT and nondiscriminatory administration of quantitative restric-
tions under Article XIII.46 Furthermore, it claimed national treatment vio-
lations under Article III of the GATT.47 The USA responded asserting that
Article XI and XIII were inapplicable and that the direct embargo was not
in violation of Article III; however, if found in violation, it was in fact
43 See TBT Agreement, Articles 2.2, 2.4, 2.5. See also SPS Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2. In US
– Tuna II, the Appellate Body attempted to provide guidance to the meaning of ‘international
standards’. See United States—Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products WT/DS381/AB/R (Appellate Brief) (16 May 2012) (hereinafter US – Tuna
II AB).
44 See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (1997), Ch. 4. See also, Petros C. Mavroidis,
‘No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts’, 102 American Journal of
International Law 421 (2008) (distinguishing between ‘sources of WTO law’, which are those
international agreements explicitly referred to within the texts of WTO agreements as well as
customary international law, and ‘interpretive elements’.).
45 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (3 September 1991). 30
O.L.M. 1594 (1991) (unadopted panel report) (hereinafter called, US – Tuna I).
46 See Ibid, para 3, 3.11. Among other arguments, Mexico also claimed that the US Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act violated Articles IX and I of the GATT. See Ibid at
para 3.
47 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. x 1361, s 101 (Hereinafter MMPA). The
MMPA essentially prohibited all importation of tuna unless the exporting country proved that
the tuna was caught according to standards in the MMPA.
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allowed under Article XX (b) and (g).48 The USA argued it was allowed to
pass such a law because it was ‘necessary’ in order to protect ‘human,
animal or plant life or health’ and because it was related to the ‘conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources’.49 In addition to claiming that the US
law was not regulating process and production methods,50 Mexico argued
that a proposal to include the ‘conservation of fisheries resources, migratory
birds or wild animals’ during the preparatory work of the Havana Charter
was specifically excluded; and therefore, that such environmental issues
should not be part of the general exceptions under Article XX.51
Furthermore, the USA referred to the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in defending its
position that it could prohibit the importation of products in order to pro-
tect endangered species.52
The GATT panel shocked many environmental groups with its decision
finding that, if Article III of GATT applied, the US measure would in fact
be violation of GATT Article III. However, the Panel explained that since
the measure related to the process of capturing tuna and not the final
product itself, in this case tuna, that GATT Article III was not applic-
able.53 Furthermore, the GATT panel found that the US moratorium was
beyond the reach of US jurisdiction and therefore, did not qualify for
any of the GATT Article XX exceptions.54 This case was significant
for the trade and environment relationship, though, in various ways. It
was the first trade case to assess the legality under trade law of a domestic
environmental regulation, setting the tone for future adjudication of envir-
onmental regulations impacting trade. Furthermore, the adjudicatory
process allowed the Parties to attempt to incorporate a multilateral envir-
onmental agreement into their claims, even if only to fortify their respect-
ive legal arguments though the Panel did not address its relevance in this
case.
48 See US – Tuna I, above n 45, paras 3.6, 3.14. The USA argued that the intermediary nation
embargo was justified under Article XX (b), (d), and (g). See Ibid para 3.7.
49 See Ibid,para 5.8.
50 Ibid, at para 3.17. The USA argued that in fact the MMPA was a regulation for process and
production methods. See Ibid, at para 3.18.
51 Ibid, at para 3.30 (referring to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
Reports of the Committees and Principle Subcommittees, ICITO/8, (‘Havana Reports’), pp.
84–85, paras 18, 21). The US disagreed and referred to previous panels finding fishery
resources to be exhaustible natural resources. See Ibid paras 3.30, 3.40.
52 See Ibid para 3.36. Mexico noted that CITES did not list the dolphins that MMPA was
intending to protect. See Ibid, at para 3.44. Convention on International Trade on
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (1 July 1975).
53 See Ibid, paras 5.10–5.15. The Panel found that Note Ad Article III was not applicable, but
did establish a violation of Article XI. See Ibid para 5.19.
54 See Ibid, paras 5.26–5.34. The Panel also found no justification for the intermediary nations
embargo under Article XX(d). See Ibid paras 5.39–5.40.
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In 1994, the European Community and the Netherlands brought another
similar complaint challenging MMPA.55 This time the emphasis was on the
secondary embargo on nations importing tuna from a state directly under the
US embargo of tuna imports.56 The GATT panel came to a similar conclusion
as in the first US-Tuna I, with an important distinction. It found that regulatory
measures for the protection of human, animal, or plant life could be valid under
Article XX(b) even if these measures were not confined to the jurisdictional
boundaries of the state implementing the regulation.57 That is, PPMs could be
legitimate under the GATT but the Panel did not provide much guidance as to
under what circumstances. In this case, though, the Panel narrowly interpreted
Article XX(b) finding that the domestic regulatory measure in question was not
‘necessary’ under Article XX(b) but recognized that nations had the right to
regulate their own exhaustible natural resources.58
In essence, though, this case solidified the decision in Tuna-Dolphin I and
gave little hope to environmentalists that the tension between trade and the
environment could be alleviated. However, it did lead to adjustments in US
law concerning tuna fishing and to multilateral negotiations among the parties
involved. Soon after, the USA and Mexico entered into the 1999 Agreement
on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP).59 Herein lies
the dialogical aspect of the trade–environment interface produced by these
early cases. First, the non-trade issue of an environmental regulation had to
be addressed within the confines of the GATT treaty, and in this way, cross-
fertilization began to take hold through the process of judicial review.60
Second, the adjudicatory force of these GATT decisions (and later ones)
led to domestic regulatory adjustments so as to bring violating Member
States into compliance with trade commitments. As in US-Tuna I, the decision
in US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline where a WTO ap-
pellate body found a 1990 US amendment to the Clean Air Act establishing a
baseline for allowable vehicle fuel emissions to be a disguised restriction on
trade, the USA signed a new 1997 regulation to comply with the WTO de-
cision.61 Third, the adjudicatory response also initiated other opportunities for
55 See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R (16 January 1994), 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994) (hereinafter US – Tuna Ia) (unadopted panel report).
56 See Ibid, at paras 2.12–2.15; 3.1. See also, MMPA, 16 U.S.C. x 1371 (a)(2)(C) (creating an
indirect embargo on nations that could not prove that tuna imports as far back as six months
did not originally come from a nation directly subject to the US embargo).
57 See Tuna – Dolphin Ia, paras 5.28–5.39.
58 See Ibid paras 5.26–5.38.
59 See Trujillo, ‘The Tuna-Dolphin Encore’, ASIL-Insights March 2012 (discussing the forma-
tion of the AIDCP).
60 See Ruti Teitel, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age’, 117 Harvard Law Review
2570 (2004), at 2584–87 (stating that ‘this view of a contemporary transnational constitu-
tional regime offers an alternative basis from which to justify comparativism that is grounded
in the processes of judicial review’.).
61 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB Report, WT/DS2/AB/R May
1996 (hereinafter called US – Gasoline).
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convergence with respect to trade and environmental issues; namely, multilat-
eral cooperation to address environmental and sustainability concerns.62
Soon after the US-Tuna cases, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development came into existence,63 which, among other things, incor-
porated the concerns of trade with those of the environment. Its force was in
the international discourse on the environment that followed; namely, the
Declaration on the Environment and Development, the Conventions on
Biodiversity and Climate Change and the ‘Agenda 21’, discussing methods
for sustainable development. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration encourages
the use of precautionary approach and discourages the use of scientific cer-
tainty as justification for allowing environmental harms.64 Even if not a le-
gally binding international treaty, the Rio Declaration attempted to address
trade concerns in the context of sustainable development by setting a new
international tone around the important linkages among trade, development,
and sustainability.
2. Shrimp – Turtle
In 1998, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand initiated a WTO complaint
alleging that the US regulation requiring that all shrimpers, foreign and do-
mestic, exporting shrimp to the USA use a ‘turtle excluder device’ (TED)
according to US agency standards. The concern was that the purse-seine
nets used to fish shrimp would accidentally catch sea turtles, an endangered
species both under the CITES and the US Endangered Species Act of
1973.65 The USA had begun international agreements with other nations
to protect the turtles. However, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand had
not entered into such an agreement with the USA.66
The WTO panel found the USA restriction to be a violation of GATT
1994 Article XI:1 violation and not justifiable under Article XX.67 The
Panel decision focused on whether the domestic regulatory measure may
affect the multilateral system in significant ways, particularly with respect
to market access.68 The USA appealed and the Appellate Body, though
62 See Teitel, above n 7 (stating that a dialogical approach may offer the possibility of cross-
fertilization and convergence, enhancing ‘global solidarity’ on certain issues like human
rights).
63 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 21 I.L. M. 874.
64 See Ibid, Principle 15.
65 US Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. x 1531 et. seq. (1973). See United States
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998;
38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) (hereinafter, Shrimp – Turtle AB Report), paras 3–6.
66 See generally, Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), at 319–20.
67 See United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R15
May 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) (hereinafter, Shrimp – Turtle Panel Report), paras 8.1–8.2.
68 Shrimp – Turtle Panel Report, para 7.51. See generally, Rob Howse, ‘The Appellate Body
Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment
Debate’, 27 Columbia Journal of International Law 491 (2002).
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agreeing that there was a violation, provided a small glimpse of hope for
environmentalists in finding that section 609 was indeed within the scope
of Article XX.69 The Appellate Body emphasized that in adjudicating a do-
mestic environmental regulation, it was important for panels to consider the
manner in which the violation is applied.70 It recognized that nations had the
sovereign right to regulate the environment; however, it faulted the USA for
having done so unilaterally and without pursuing a multilateral forum.71
However, it also clarified that unlike the Panel’s conclusion, the legal analysis
under Article XX does not require a look into whether a domestic regulation
undermines the multilateral trading system; rather, the crucial issue is
whether it poses an ‘unjustifiable discrimination between countries’.72 The
Appellate Body determined this measure as unjustifiable and arbitrary under
the chapeau of Article XX, the gatekeeper for possible Article XX excep-
tions.73 Without imposing a duty on nations to negotiate multilaterally, the
Appellate Body once again brought domestic environmental regulations
within its jurisdictional domain, and was cautious of unilateral solutions,
while encouraging negotiated solutions.
Unlike the US-Tuna Reports, Shrimp-Turtle was decided under the WTO
dispute settlement body and the panel and Appellate Body reports were
adopted. However, like US-Tuna I, in Shrimp-Turtle, the USA cited a multi-
lateral environmental agreement, CITES, to provide strength to its argument
that in fact section 609 was compliant because it protected an endangered
species as noted in this international environmental agreement.74 The
Appellate Body also referred to environmental treaties and resolutions such
as UNCLOS and Agenda 21 and considered the Resolution on Assistance to
Developing Countries.75 Though the WTO still has not clarified the rela-
tionship of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or international
resolutions to the WTO Covered Agreements or to the trade regime, these
strategic legal arguments on the part of the Parties and the willingness of the
WTO dispute settlement bodies (DSB) to entertain these arguments high-
lights the dialogical qualities of the adjudicatory capacity of the WTO when
it comes to trade and the environment. This has contributed enhanced cross-
fertilization between the two camps.
Furthermore, Shrimp-Turtle also recognized that exhaustible resources
under Article XX(g) are not limited to non-living natural resources; that
69 Shrimp – Turtle AB Report, para 10.
70 Ibid, para 115.
71 See Howse, above n 68.
72 Shrimp – Turtle AB Report, above n 65 paras 12–13; 15; 116.
73 Article XX. Shrimp – Turtle AB Report, above n 65 paras 158–60.
74 Shrimp – Turtle, above n 65 para 25. The USA argued that ‘Section 609 ‘‘relates to’’ the
conservation of sea turtles’ and therefore is justified under Article XX(g). See Ibid at para 26.
75 Ibid, at para 130.
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‘ ‘‘exhaustible’’ and ‘‘renewable’’ natural resources are [not] mutually exclu-
sive and that they are ‘‘suspectible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction,
frequently because of human activities’’ ’.76 This recognition further high-
lights the role of the WTO adjudicatory process in cross-fertilizing trade
regulation with that of the preservation of natural resources.
Though disturbing to environmentalists,77 these early environment and
trade disputes allowed the DSB to better identify the role of Article XX
with respect to the trade and environment relationship. Though not fully
understood at the time, Shrimp-Turtle changed the way Appellate Bodies
would deal with the compliance of environmental measures to the trade
regime, recognizing that trade treaty interpretations had to be in light of
environmental concerns.78
B. Role of judicial discretion
The early environmental cases demonstrated the ability of DSB panels to
exercise judicial discretion not only in narrowing or expanding the scope of
provisions in the GATT, but also in choosing to use judicial economy to not
adjudicate under certain provisions or to ignore outside sources of interna-
tional environmental law such as MEAs and the Rio Declaration. These are
also pinnacle moments for the convergence of trade and environmental
issues, highlighting the important role of the adjudicatory.79 Furthermore,
in this cross-fertilization trade panels may choose to incorporate domestic
environmental and other regulations into the legal framework of trade and to
interpret the trade treaties in ways that recognize the legitimacy of some
domestic regulations. EC-Asbestos, for example, illustrated the willingness
of the WTO DSB to broaden GATT Article III to accommodate for cate-
gories of ‘like products’ that could include legitimate regulatory measures.80
When addressing environmental concerns, the way trade deals with relevant
legal concepts such as process and production methods and the precaution-
ary principle becomes increasingly important.
76 US – Shrimp, above n 65 para 128.
77 See Howse, above n 68, at 494.
78 See US – Shrimp, above n 65 para 129.
79 See John Knox, ‘The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment’,
28 Harvard Environmental Law Review 1 (2004) (discussing that the Appellate Body’s role in
‘greening . . . trade jurisprudence’ is primarily motivated by political concerns).
80 See European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/
DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001) (hereinafter EC – Asbestos) para 99. For more discussion on
the way in which the AB contextualized Article III for distinguishing between products with
and without chrysotile asbestos fibers, see Elizabeth Trujillo, ‘Mission Possible: Reciprocal
Deference Between Domestic Regulatory Structures and the WTO’, 40 Cornell International
Law Journal 201 (2007), at 221, 225.
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1. PPMs
Traditionally, trade dispute settlement bodies have been hesitant to allow
regulations designed to regulate process and production methods as seen
in the first two Tuna-Dolphin reports. The primary goal of the multilateral
trade regime has been to provide market access to products and reduce tariff
and non-tariff barriers. In doing so, the language of the GATT treaty as well
as other related Covered Agreements focus on the products themselves,
rather than on processes that go into making of the product. This is not
to say, though, that the WTO agreements discard entirely the notion of
process. There has been much debate about PPMs.81 Shrimp-Turtle clearly
opened the door for the possibility of PPMs to be within the scope of Article
XX exceptions.82
One WTO case that exemplifies some of these issues in the context of the
SPS Agreement is European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, dealing with European restrictions on the
importation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).83 The European
Union (EU) passed regulations for requiring labels for foods that contained
GMOs. Argentina, the USA, and Canada brought this issue before the WTO
alleging these requirements to be violations of the GATT and the SPS
Agreement.84 The WTO panel ruled in favor of the complainants in this
case. With respect to the process–product distinction, the WTO agreed with
the argument that the emphasis for WTO adjudication of these measures
should be on the final product rather than on the process, especially when
the end-product is ‘substantially equivalent’ to the product at the beginning
of production.85 The panel found the EU measures inconsistent with the
SPS Agreement because they were not based on risk assessments and un-
substantiated by scientific evidence. It also found that these labels were not
in compliance with GATT and that the EU measure amounted to a mora-
torium between 1999 and 2003 on approval of biotech products, providing
81 See Christiane R. Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law: Interfacing
trade and social goals (2011), at 20–31. For more on the development of process–product legal
doctrine, see generally Robert Hudec, ‘The Process-Product Doctrine in GATT/WTO
Jurisprudence’, in Bronkers and Quick (eds), New Directions, (2000), 187–217.
82 US – Shrimp Appellate Report, paras 10, 12, 115–123. See also Doug Kysar, ‘Preferences for
Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice’ 118
Harvard Law Review 525 (2004).
83 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/
DS291,292,293/INTERIM (hereinafter ‘EC – Biotech Products’).
84 See Ibid. See also SPS agreement above n 42.
85 EU – Biotech Products, above n 83. In EC – Hormones, the WTO sided with the USA in stating
that non-product related PPM’s should not be a distinguishing factor between meat products
with or without hormones because they are the ‘substantial equivalent’ of each other and it
does not change the final product. Report of the Appellate Body on European Communities-
Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WTIDS26/ABIR (16
January 1998).
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‘undue delays’ in the EU approval process in violation of Article 8 of the SPS
Agreement.86
Though the ultimate outcome of this case was based on a procedural issue
regarding risk assessment, EC-Biotech Products has several dialogical effects
where the WTO panel engaged with non-trade legal domains concerning the
environment. First, the Panel received three unsolicited amicus curiae briefs
and the parties.87 Non-party amicus curiae briefs is one way that conver-
gence is taking place, for it allows non-state actors, such as NGO’s and
private entities, to penetrate the trade framework.88
Second, the Panel in EC-Biotech allowed parties the opportunity to seek
advice from scientific and technical experts and decided that certain
categories of issues required expert advice, in particular with respect to stand-
ards for risk assessment for each biotech product in question.89 Third, the
Panel addressed the relevance of rules of international law outside of trade;
namely, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Biosafety Protocol, and
the precautionary principle.90 It ultimately concluded that because one of the
four parties had not ratified the latter two multilateral environmental agree-
ments, they would not be applicable to this case, according to its interpretation
of Article 31(3)(c).91 With respect to the precautionary principle, the Panel
decided to follow precedent and not apply it ‘[s]ince the legal status of the
precautionary principle remains unsettled’ as a matter of international law.92
Finally, out of the initial dispute around bio-tech products came dialogue.
The EU and Argentina subsequently entered into negotiations as to the
timeframe in which the EU would adjust its measures to comport with the
WTO decision. After postponing this timeframe several times, in March
2010, Argentina and the EU notified the WTO that they had agreed to
establish bilateral dialogue on issues related to biotechnology and agricul-
ture.93 The EU and the USA have not reached an agreement on the issue,
though ongoing dialogue continues.94 The source of the debate lies in part,
86 EU – Biotech Products, above n 83.
87 See e.g. Ibid, paras 7.10–11.
88 See US –Tuna II Panel Report, above n 23 paras 7.1–7.9; 7.182–7.183; 7.288, 7.363 where
the Panel addressed issues raised in the Written Submission of Non-Party Amici Curiae,
Humane Society International American University, Washington College of Law, Program
on International and Comparative Environmental Law, WT/DS381, 6 May 2010. In the
Glamis Gold NAFTA case, amicus curiae briefs were also submitted and accepted by the
NAFTA investor–state tribunal.
89 See Ibid, paras 7.31–32.
90 See Ibid, paras 7.51–54.
91 See paras paras 7.74–75. The USA has not ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity
and not signed the Biosafety Protocol.
92 See EU – Biotech Products paras 7.87–89. See also EC – Hormones paras 123–24.
93 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds293_e.htm. The EU and Canada have
also reached a similar agreement, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1142_en.htm.
94 See Charles E. Hanrahan, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology: The U.S.-EU Dispute’, CRS Report
for Congress (8 April 2010), available at www.crs.gov.
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in the different regulatory schemes between the USA and the EU. The US
regulation of GMO products does not regulate those products that are sub-
stantially equivalent to those without GMOs. The EU, on the other hand, is
less willing to accept GMO products and after 2004, labeling has been
focused on informing consumers of GMOs in products for consumption
by taking a precautionary approach.95
The issue of PPMs is at the heart of many environmental regulations,
especially those concerning climate change initiatives. It is perhaps one of
the most controversial issues for the WTO. Product labeling and traceability
issues regarding the products have also moved to the center of the debate,
issues that more recent cases like the US – Tuna II case highlight. Resolving
the relationship between PPMs and trade is particularly important when
developing climate change policies, since strategies incentivizing ‘cleaner’
more energy efficient products are not necessarily directed to the final prod-
uct itself, but to the way a product is manufactured or obtained.96 However,
because of the difficulty in finding a multilateral solution regarding PPMs,
the judicial discretion of the WTO DSB takes on a heightened role. As is
shown in US-Tuna II, it can adjudicate PPMs and bring them within the
scope of trade jurisprudence without explicitly ruling on their relevance or
legitimacy, except on a case by case basis.
2. US-Tuna II
The 2012 US-Tuna II case provides an example of judicial discretion as
applied to a technical regulation regarding environmental labeling. In this
case, Mexico claimed that the US dolphin-safe labeling scheme under the
US Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act and related regulations
and rulings violated the GATT and TBT because it was a discriminatory
‘technical regulation’ that was more trade-restrictive than necessary, unjus-
tifiably failing to use an international standard as its basis.97 The labeling
scheme, intended to protect dolphins from purse-seine fishing nets and
inform consumers, was not required for tuna imports, but if applied, con-
tained specific requirements enforceable under the US law. The regulation
required a certification that (i) no tuna was caught in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Region (ETP), impacting Mexican tuna, (ii) no tuna was caught by
‘setting on’ dolphins, and (iii) ‘no dolphins were killed or seriously injured’.98
95 See Daniel W. Dresner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes,
(Princeton University Press, 2007), 149–175.
96 Towards Green Growth, pp. 36–38; 46–50, 2011, available at http://www.oecd.org/
greengrowth/48224539.pdf.
97 See Trujillo, The Tuna-Dolphin Encore, above n 59. Mexico claimed that the USA labeling
scheme violated TBT Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 as well as GATT Articles I:1 and III:4. See
also, Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. x 1385 (1990) [DPCIA]; 50
C.F.R. 216.91-92; Earth Island Institute v Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.2007), amended by
494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007).
98 US – Tuna II Panel Report, above n 23, paras 2.3–2.16.
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The USA claimed and provided evidence that dolphins were more at risk in
the ETP than outside of it due to the prevalence of purse-seine fishing
methods.
One of the legal issues raised in this case was whether the US dolphin-safe
label was a ‘technical regulation’ under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,
which would make the label a mandatory government label. The Panel spent
some time finding that in fact it was mandatory because the regulation ‘pre-
scribe[d] and impose[d] the conditions under which a product may be
labelled dolphin-safe’, though the label itself was not required by the US
government in order to sell tuna products.99 The Panel’s decision seems to
imply that virtually any state action may in fact turn a labeling scheme into a
mandatory technical regulation. The Appellate Body, in addressing the US’s
appeal of this issue, agreed that this measure was a technical regulation since
it set out legally mandated set of requirements to obtain the dolphin-safe
label and specific enforcement mechanisms.100 In doing so, the Appellate
Body implied that any regulation, including one that regulated the process
and production method, with government oversight and enforcement would
be deemed mandatory for purposes of the TBT Agreement; and therefore,
could come within the scope of a ‘technical regulation’. In this way, judicial
discretion by the Appellate Body further enhanced cross-fertilization of trade
and environmental issues, bringing not only a PPM but a non-product
related PPM within the jurisdictional scope of a trade agreement. Other
dialogical effects include (i) the Panel’s and AB’s recognition of the legitim-
acy of the environmental agreement, AIDCP, and its relevance to the facts in
this case, even if it was found not to be a relevant standardizing body by the
Appellate Body, and (ii) the willingness of the Panel to admit a non-party
amicus brief and refer to it in its decision.101 Recently, the USA adjusted its
dolphin-safe labeling scheme to comply with the WTO decision; however,
the Mexican government has issued a statement that the two-tiered US
regulatory scheme still discriminates against Mexican tuna imports and
does not comply with the WTO decision.102 In this way, US-Tuna II pro-
vides another dialogical effect: that of the domestic regulatory response con-
cerning environmental protection to trade adjudication.
99 Ibid, para 7.131. The minority dissent did not agree with the majority opinion that the USA
labeling scheme was mandatory; and therefore, a technical regulation.
100 US-Tuna II AB Report, above n 23, paras 193–94.
101 Mexico’s Responses to the Panel’s Questions From the Second Substantive Meeting, DS381,
para 88 (19 January 2010). See also, Comments of the USA on the Answers of Mexico to
the Second Set of Questions from the Panel to the Parties, DS381, para 10 (26 January
2011).
102 See US Federal Register, Rules and Regulation, Vol. 78, July 9, 2013, Enhanced Document
Requirements to Support Use of the Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products. But also see Mexican
response from the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, Me´xico impugnara´ ante la OMC la nueva
regulacio´n de Estados Unidos sobre etiquetado ‘dolphin safe’, available at http://www.sagarpa.gob.
mx/saladeprensa/2012/Paginas/2013B392.aspx.
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The Panel called for judicial economy and dealt with the issue solely under
the TBT Agreement.103 The Appellate Body agreed with Mexico’s appeal
that the panel acted ‘inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in deciding to
exercise judicial economy’ regarding claims of GATT violations.104 However,
the Appellate Body ultimately did not decide these claims. This interesting
dance between the relevant GATT provisions and the TBT Agreements,
without clarification as to their relationship, allows the WTO DSB freedom
to expand on its reasoning for allowing or disallowing certain regulatory
measures. This judicial discretion, while arguably providing for more flexi-
bility regarding trade and domestic regulation, also increases uncertainty
with respect to how trade panels will deal with regulatory measures more
generally and environmental ones more specifically.
3. China and raw materials
Finally, in a very recent controversy involving Chinese exportation of raw
materials, the WTO panel and Appellate Body have made important strides
in interpreting the scope of GATT Article XI (quantitative restrictions) ex-
ceptions and of Article XX.105 China created a system of export restrictions
and quotas for nine of its raw materials, many of which are only available in
China. These restrictions affected supply chains and increased export prices.
China defended its position against the complainants, which included the
USA, the EU, and Mexico, by claiming that the restrictions were justified
because of ‘critical shortages’, an exception under Article XI of the GATT
regarding the elimination of quantitative restrictions. The Appellate Body
agreed with the Panel in rejecting this justification.
This was the first time the WTO addressed this issue of critical shortages
on essential raw materials, an issue of particular importance to industrialized
countries where a developing country holds such a monopoly on rich natural
resources.106 Furthermore, the WTO for the first time had to address the
applicability of Article XX to China’s obligations under paragraph 11.3 of
China’s accession protocol. The WTO panel and Appellate Body found that
Article XX did not apply to the accession protocol.107 As in US-Tuna II and
other cases, the WTO did not provide clarification to the question of
whether Article XX may justify violations to other WTO Covered
Agreements, a ‘fall-back option’.108 The relationship between the GATT
and other Covered Agreements remains unclear, but in leaving it unclear,
the WTO dispute settlement bodies allow themselves discretion on how to
103 US – Tuna II Panel Report, above n 23, para 7.748.
104 See Mexico’s appellant submission at paras 206 & 211, and US-Tuna II AB Report above
n 23 at paras 405–406.
105 China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394,395,398/
AB/R (22 February 2012) (hereinafter China – Raw Materials).
106 See ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 16, no. 4, February 2012.
107 See Ibid. See also, China – Raw Materials, above n 104.
108 ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 16, no. 4, February 2012.
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interpret these provisions and in deciding which agreements are the most
applicable in any given case. However, the Appellate Body also used its
judicial discretion to ‘harden’ the bargained-for provisions of the Accession
Protocol into its interpretation of relevant GATT provisions. This case illus-
trates the way in which the administrative and adjudicatory functions of the
WTO may reinforce one another.
Most recently, the USA, the EU, and Japan have initiated another dispute
regarding Chinese export restrictions on rare earths.109 China produces 97%
of the world production of rare earths which are used for many clean energy
products such as wind power turbines, energy efficient bulbs, engines for
hybrid and electric bulbs, as well as for parts for smart phones, LED dis-
plays, and other modern-day products.110 Similar issues will reemerge as in
the China-Raw Materials case, and the USA, the EU, and Japan are in a good
position to win this case if the WTO panels decide to follow a similar rea-
soning to the previous case. These cases raise interesting issues not only
concerning essential natural resources and trade compliance, but also the
role of developing countries such as China in maintaining control of import-
ant natural resources for supply chains.
It is not an accident that the adjudicatory capacity of the WTO has
become a forum for dialogue in these instances, even if the ‘dialogue’
takes the form of a dispute. The legitimacy of the WTO in arbitrating
these kinds of disputes provides winning nations with important ammunition
for pressuring other countries into compliance with trade regulations; but
more importantly, for finding bilateral, regional, and multilateral solutions
when it comes to global supply chains and natural resources.111
C. Recent trade and environment disputes
The more recent trade and environment disputes are arguably different from
the earlier ones in that they primarily deal with issues around subsidies,
countervailing duties, and export restrictions, rather than national treatment
violations.112 One of those disputes has already been discussed, involving
China and its export restrictions on raw materials.113 Recent cases regarding
domestic local content subsidies raise questions as to the ways in which the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures may predominate the
109 BNA Reporter, 29 ITR 398, 15 March 2012. See China-Measures Related to the
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, Request for Consulationas by
US, EU, and Japan, WT/DS432/433/431, 24 September 2012, available at https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm.
110 BNA Reporter, 29 ITR 39, 15 March 2012.
111 Keisuke Iida, ‘Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?’, 10 Global Governance 207 (2004),
at 210.
112 Mark Wu and James Salzman, ‘The Next Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts:
The Rise of Green Industrial Policy’, draft with authors.
113 See China – Raw Materials, above n 103. See above Section III.B.3.
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trade and environment discourse in the future.114 Several WTO cases have
emerged where subsidies with local content requirements are involved; for
example, two cases involve subsidies and countervailing duties, triggering the
GATT, and the SCM Agreement115 and two disputes deal with export re-
strictions on raw materials and rare earths, triggering once again provisions
under the GATT.116
These cases arguably differ from early ones in that they emerge out of
domestic industrial policy about how to best incentivize investment in the
renewable energy sector. To the extent subsidies incentivize such investment,
governments are inclined to provide them as a means of not only addressing
perceived climate change threats but also as a means to increase job avail-
ability, thereby enabling governments to gather the political muster to legal-
ize such subsidies. In this way, the trade and environment interface is
evolving into more than finding ways to ‘green’ trade law;117 but rather,
into managing domestic industrial policy that has as its goal green economic
development. In this modern, ‘greener’ economic landscape, the WTO has
potentially a larger role to play than ensuring trade compliance. In particular
through its administrative capacity, it also can help redefine the manner in
which economies develop and the extent to which ‘‘green’’ policies converge
with trade goals.118
In this modern paradigm of trade, export-led strategies take the limelight.
The USA and the EU have used subsidies to incentivize green growth.119
Corn subsidies in the USA, for example, became more than just an agricul-
tural subsidy but part of the renewable energy plan for the production of
corn-based ethanol.120 China and India are also using subsidies to jump-start
the renewable energy sectors in their countries. Therefore, it is not surprising
114 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Article 1.1(a)(1), 15 April 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14 (hereinafter SCM Agreement).
115 The USA 2010 Request for WTO consultations regarding China-Wind Power Subsidies,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/december/united-
states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con; India—Solar Feed in Tariff; See Canada –
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector (Japan), WT/DS412/1
(19 December 2012 Panel Report (hereinafter Canada – Renewable Energy Generation
Sector (Japan)) and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (EU), WT/
DS426/1 (19 December 2012 Panel Report) (hereinafter Canada – Feed-in Tariff program),
consolidated and modified by WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R, (Appellate Body
Report 6 May 2013). The Panel and Appellate Body in the latter two of these cases
found local content rules in Ontario’s Green Energy Act to be in a trade violation. See Ibid.
116 See China – Raw Materials, above n 103. See China-Rare Earths above n 109.
117 See Knox, above n 79.
118 See below Section VI.
119 Arunabha Ghosh and Himani Gangania, ‘Governing Clean Energy Subsidies: What, Why,
and How Legal?’, ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable
Energy (August 2012).
120 See Renewable Fuel Standards, US Energy Policy Act (2005) (mandating use of renewable
fuel).
Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment 557
 at Texas A
&
M
 College Station on A
ugust 12, 2016
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
that emerging WTO disputes are between industrialized countries like Japan,
the USA, and the EU and increasingly include emerging economies like
China and India.121 In these more modern cases, not only does the WTO
adjudicatory capacity allow for more cross-fertilization of trade and environ-
mental issues around domestic efforts to move national economies toward
‘clean’ economies, but it can also lead to enhanced collaboration among
these nations to work together in identifying which government supported
clean energy programs will be tolerated under the trade rules.122
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY OF TRADE REGIMES
The concerns raised in the Rio Declaration did make their way to the trade
regimes, not only to trade adjudication, but also with the creation of cen-
tralized bodies within the multilateral trade regime specializing in investigat-
ing the connection between trade and the environment. Furthermore, PTAs
also contain administrative functions in addition to adjudicatory ones. This
section will discuss the administrative capacities of the WTO and PTAs, and
the ways that these have enhanced the cross-fertilization of trade and the
environment.
A. Secretariat and committees
The work of the committees, such as the CTE, and the Secretariat are sig-
nificant in moving forward cross-fertilization of trade and environmental
issues.123 There are several discussions in the WTO regarding trade and
the environment, and more specifically, trade and climate change.124 The
Doha Agenda, though currently stalled, has tasked the Trade and
Environment Committee with dealing with the Doha work program on
trade and the environment.125 The WTO Trade and Environment
Committee have held information sessions with MEA Secretariats and the
121 See Canada – Renewable Energy Generation Sector (Japan), above n 114; Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, above n 114.
122 See e.g. John Smirnow, ‘U.S. –India Solar Trade Dispute at the WTO Could Spur
Collaboration’, Renewable Energy World.com (7 February 2013).
123 See Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements, Annex II, WTO Secretariat (1999), at 256.
See Greg Schaffer, ‘The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters’, 25 Harvard
Environmental Law Review 1 (2001).
124 See e.g. ‘The Thinking Ahead on International Trade (TAIT) 2nd Conference on Climate
Change, Trade and Competitiveness: Issues for the WTO,’ Geneva, 16–18 June 2010;
‘Special Sessions’ of the Trade and Environment Committee, available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm. See also Trade and Climate Change WTO-UNEP
Report 2009, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.
pdf.
125 See DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/Dec. 1, 20
November 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mind
ecl_e.htm.
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2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg called for
a more cooperation among United Nations Economic Program (UNEP)
United Nations bodies, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the WTO.126
Furthermore, the CTE has been instrumental in providing technical assist-
ance for developing countries regarding trade and environment concerns
through regional seminars and capacity building initiatives.127
The Secretariat also plays a key role in bringing convergence between
trade and environmental concerns. Regarding climate change issues, Pascal
Lamy has emphasized a multilateral approach.128 In a speech with trade
ministers at the Bali Climate Change Conference, Lamy stated:
‘the relationship between international trade — and indeed the WTO —
and climate change, would be best defined by a consensual international
accord on climate change that successfully embraces all major
polluters.’129
But he also conceded that ‘trade regulations are not, and cannot be, a sub-
stitute for environmental regulations’. He emphasized that an environmental
forum such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change would be the appropriate place to address climate change concerns;
however, that a climate change agreement ‘must then send the WTO an
appropriate signal on how its rules may best be put to the service of sustain-
able development’.130
The Secretariat has followed through on this approach in its active par-
ticipation in other for dealing with environmental and climate change issues.
For example, to parallel the recent United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Durban, it co-hosted with the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) a Trade and Climate
Change Symposium in December 2011.131 The WTO had a presence in
the 2012 Rio + 20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development and pub-
lished Harnessing Trade for Sustainable Development and a Green Economy in
126 See UN Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South
Africa, August 2002, available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/131302_
wssd_report_reissued.pdf.
127 See e.g. 2010 WTO Regional Workshop on the Relationship between the Trade and
Environment Regimes for Asia and the Pacific in Singapore, available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_ta_e.htm#national_wkshops.
128 See e.g. Pascal Lamy’s Speech to a EU Parliament panel on 29 May 2008, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl91_e.htm.
129 Pascal Lamy’s speech at the Informal Trade Ministers’ dialogue on Climate Change in Bali,
8–9 December 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm.
130 Ibid.
131 The WTO co-hosted the Symposium with the South African Department of Trade and
Industry and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. See http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/events_e/dur_trade_dec11_e.htm.
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anticipation of this.132 The annual Public Forum held at the WTO head-
quarters provides another means of encouraging dialogue among trade and
non-trade interest groups, and has focused several discussions on mitigation
of climate change.133
B. The impact of committee decisions on the adjudicatory function
The negotiated efforts taking place at the committee level of the WTO can
not be ignored. Specifically, the WTO trade and environment committee
attempts to move the dialogue forward as it pertains to specific environmen-
tal issues that trade impacts, such as fisheries and agriculture but also gov-
ernance issues such as the relationship between the WTO and Multilateral
Environmental Agreements.134 Furthermore, the 2001 Doha agenda
addresses specific issues covered in the committees, such as the prevention
of ‘green protectionism’ and labeling requirements for environmental pur-
poses.135 However, with the recent impasse of the Doha Round, Doha
Ministerial decisions and WTO Committee decisions seem to be gaining
in importance at the adjudicatory level.
Subject to certain procedural requirements, the WTO Ministerial
Conference and General Council has ‘the exclusive authority to adopt inter-
pretations’ of WTO agreements under Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Recently, WTO dis-
pute settlement bodies have referred to WTO Committee and Ministerial
decisions as ‘subsequent agreement[s]’ within the meaning of Article
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.136 Article 31(3)(1) of the Vienna
Convention states that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance with
‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions’.137
In U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, for example, Indonesia alleged that the USA
regulation prohibiting cigarettes containing flavors other than tobacco or
menthol violated trade provisions of the TBT Agreement and the GATT;
132 See ‘‘Harnessing Trade for Sustainable Development and a Green Economy,’’ available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/brochure_rio_20_e.pdf.
133 See e.g. WTO Public Forum 2007 session on ‘The Role of Trade in Supporting
International Efforts to Mitigate Climate Change’, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
forums_e/public_forum2007_e/public_forum07_e.htm.
134 See e.g. ‘List of Documents’, WT/CTE/INF/5/Rev.10, available at http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm (listing the documents circulated and discussed
at the CTE until November 2011).
135 See DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/Dec. 1,
November 20, 2001, para 31 available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/mindecl_e.htm; see Doha Agenda for the CTE, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte_doha_e.htm.
136 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article (3)(a), 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
137 Ibid.
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and more specifically, that the USA did not publish the requirements within
a ‘reasonable interval’ under Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement. The
Appellate Body looked to a Doha Ministerial Decision that stated that ‘rea-
sonable interval’ should be understood to mean a timeframe of not less than
six months, ‘except when this would be ineffective in fulfilling the legitimate
objectives pursued by a technical regulation.’138
In US-Tuna II, the Appellate Body, in order to decide whether the USA in
enacting its dolphin-safe labeling scheme was in violation of Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement, had to determine whether the AIDCP scheme com-
plied with the definition of ‘international standards’ under the TBT
Agreement. Article 2.4 states that Members shall use relevant internationals
as ‘a basis for their technical regulations except when such international
standards . . . would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfill-
ment of the legitimate objectives pursued . . .’139 However, ‘international
standards’ are not defined in the TBT Agreement and the panel instead
looked to the definition in the ISO/IEC Guide.140 While the Appellate
Body did not disagree with the panel’s judicial discretion here, it concluded
that the TBT Annex 1 would take precedence to the extent of inconsistency.
Since Annex 1 states that a standard is approved by a ‘body’ rather than an
‘organization (as in the ISO/IEC Guide),’ the determination of whether the
AIDCP scheme was adopted by and ‘international standardizing body’ had
to be made according to this definition.141 Furthermore, such a body must
be ‘open’ and ‘recognized’ in its standardization activities. The Appellate
Body looked to the TBT Committee Decision to interpret ‘open’ and
‘recognized activities in standardization’ by declaring that this Decision
was in fact a ‘subsequent agreement’ within the meaning of Article
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.142 Contrary to
the Panel decision, the Appellate Body found that the AIDCP scheme was
not ‘open’ because membership was conditioned to an invitation; and there-
fore, not a relevant international standard under Article 2.4.143
Though the Appellate Decision regarding the USA violation of Article 2.4
did not change the Panel’s outcome that the US regulatory scheme was not
in violation of Article 2.4, the reasoning was very different and significant. In
taking the position that (i) the TBT Annex 1 would take precedence over the
ISO/IEC Guide where there was inconsistency, and (ii) that the TBT
138 See US – Clove Cigarettes AB Report, above n 1, paras 266; 267–268.
139 See Ibid, para 343. See also TBT Agreement, above n 42 Article 2.4.
140 See US – Tuna II Panel Report, above n 23 para 7.663; see ISO/IEC (International
Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission) Guide
2:1991, General Terms and their Definitions concerning Standardization and Related
Activities (6th edn, 1991) (hereinafter ISO/IEC Guide).
141 US – Tuna II AB Report, above n 23 paras 353–54.
142 See Ibid, at para 372.
143 See Ibid, at paras 398–99.
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Committee Decision not only provided interpretative guidance but also had
legal force as to legal interpretations of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate
Body took an important step as to the applicability of Committee decisions
in judicial decisions. Using a dialogical lens, the Appellate Body’s willingness
in both these cases to incorporate Ministerial and Committee decisions as
rule of law shows that it can use its judicial discretion to ‘communicate’ with
the administrative capacity of the WTO.
C. Preferential trade agreements
Post 1994, there was a surge in regional and bilateral trade agreements.
Unique to these agreements, as compared to the WTO Covered
Agreements, was that the relationship of environmental issues with trade
was explicitly incorporated within the legal framework of trade in specific
ways. Some PTAs, like the NAFTA, even formally recognized international
environmental agreements into their trade structure. The first significant
trade agreements of this kind were the Maastricht Treaty (EU),144 the
NAFTA,145 and MERCOSUR.146 While aspiring to very different goals,
both address environmental issues as well as other regulatory concerns
such as labor. Within the legal framework of these PTAs, there are admin-
istrative and adjudicatory functions that contribute to the cross-fertilization
of trade and environmental issues.
1. Some US regional trade agreements
The rising concerns regarding the impact trade may have on the environment
culminated in the passing of NAFTA, the first PTA to explicitly incorporate
environmental concerns into a trade agreement.147 There are examples of the
interplay of environment and trade throughout the NAFTA. The Chapters
on Standard Related Measures and Agriculture and Phytosanitary Measures
both specifically attempt to balance the need of states to protect the envir-
onment and to expand free trade. Furthermore, the chapter on foreign direct
investment recognizes that the investment chapter should not be construed
144 Treaty on European Union [TEU, Maastricht Treaty], 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191)
1; 31 I.L.M. 253 (1992). This article will not focus on the EU, however, it is important to
note that the EU has explicitly tried to deal with issues around the environment and sus-
tainability through, for example, Emissions Trading System (ETS). See EU Emissions
Trading System (2008).
145 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, 17
December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, reprinted in The NAFTA (United States Government
Printing Office ed., 1993) (hereinafter NAFTA).
146 See Treaty of Asuncio´n, 26 March 1991, reprinted in 30 International Legal Materials 1044
(1991). Members include Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay and associated members
are Chile and Bolivia (hereinafter MERCOSUR).
147 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 14 September 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1480, reprinted in The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements (United States
Government Printing Office ed., 1993) (hereinafter NAAEC).
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as preventing Parties from adopting and enforcing domestic environmental
measures.148 The NAFTA contains several references to MEA’s and urges
NAFTA parties who are members of those treaties to not use the NAFTA as
a means for noncompliance with those treaties.149 Article 104, for example,
is the result of the bargaining of Canadian, USA, and Mexican stakeholders
regarding environmental issues and trade. Of particular interest to Canada at
the time, it recognizes certain international environmental agreements as
having priority over the NAFTA in the event there is inconsistency in the
compliance with the Agreements. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora are among these.150 While the NAFTA incorporates certain
MEAs into its provisions, the WTO has not yet taken a position on its
relationship to MEAs and has not incorporated them into its Covered
Agreements.151
In addition to specific provisions dealing with environmental regulations
and some MEAs, the NAFTA provides a side agreement on environmental
issues to the trade agreement. The North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was an attempt not only to bring
environmental issues into the trade discourse, but also a way of converging
the softer qualities of international environmental frameworks into the harder
framework of a free trade agreement. However, the NAAEC arguably does
little to raise environmental standards, for it only requires NAFTA Parties to
enforce their already existing environmental laws.152 Though it contains in-
stitutional structure through the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) and its dispute settlement body,153 the NAAEC suffers
from its inherent internal structure. The Council consists of cabinet-level
representatives of each of the Parties.154 Furthermore, the Council selects
148 NAFTA above n 145, art. 1114. Annex 301.3 also recognizes that the national treatment
provision of NAFTA shall not apply to certain environmental measures within certain inter-
national agreements to which the Parties are already signatories.
149 NAFTA above n 145, arts. 103 & 104.
150 See NAFTA above n 145, Art. 104. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989), 22 March
1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125; Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 16 September 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1 January 1989); Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 27
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973).
151 But see, ‘The Doha Mandate on Multilateral Environmental Agreements,’ available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm.
152 See NAAEC, above n 147, Articles 14–15.
153 Ibid, at Part 3. The Commission consists of a Council, Secretariat, and Joint Public Advisory
Committee.
154 See NAAEC, above n 147, Article 9.
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the Executive Director of the Secretariat.155 These factors subject the agree-
ment to domestic politics of each NAFTA Party; and therefore, its execution
can become very politicized.156 Despite these defects, the CEC provides a
central administrative forum for discussion of environmental matters among
the North American partners and for further coordination and harmoniza-
tion of environmental regulations among the three nations. Articles 14 and
15 provide for citizen submissions, both by non-governmental organizations
and individuals, to the Secretariat asserting a Party’s failure to comply with
its own environmental laws. This process has resulted in several public sub-
mission reports, which has also contributed to broader awareness of the
connection between trade and environmental issues among trade and non-
trade communities.157 Furthermore, the NAAEC provides for a Joint Public
Advisory Committee, consisting of 15 members of civil society and which
advises the Council on environmental matters within the scope of the envir-
onmental side agreement.158 The CEC, though weak in its ability to raise or
enforce existing environmental standards, has played an important role for
more discourse on environmental and trade matters, not only through its
citizen submission process which allows for enhanced participation from
non-trade stakeholders, but also through research forums and workshops,
publication of annual reports, and public commentary to CEC research.159
It has even included on its agenda the need to promote harmonization for
renewable electricity markets in North America. The CEC published in
2007 an Executive Summary on the topic, providing an overview of key
market demand and supply side drivers for renewable electricity in the
three NAFTA countries and calling for enhanced ways of furthering cooper-
ation and harmonization in this area for the NAFTA region.160 In these
ways, the NAAEC, through the administrative function of the CEC, has
provided a more formalized forum for discourse of trade, environmental,
and even energy issues, leading to enhanced cross-fertilization.
The NAAEC, living alongside NAFTA, also contains an adjudicatory
mechanism so that parties can bring a claim of an environmental dispute.
While this mechanism is not as strong as in the investment context, where
monetary damages are granted if a violation is found, it does provide injured
155 See NAAEC, above n 147, Aricles 11 and 15.
156 See Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 Temple
International and Comparative Law Journal 257, 263–264, 281–282.
157 See NAAEC, above n 147, Article 14.
158 See NAAEC above n 147, Article 16.
159 See generally, CEC Annual Reports from 1995–2006, available at http://www.cec.org/Page.
asp?PageID=30107&SiteNodeID=648. See also ‘Public Commentary to CEC research and
reports’, available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&ContentID=&SiteNodeID=
222&BL_ExpandID=.
160 See CEC Executive Summary, ‘Fostering Renewable Electricity Markets in North America’,
available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/59/5125_FREM_en.pdf.
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parties with an adjudicatory forum for the enforcement of domestic envir-
onmental regulations.161 However, this mechanism has never been used.
Administrative capacity of the NAAEC has been more influential in cross-
fertilizing trade and environmental issues at the regional level than its
adjudicatory function. The same phenomenon will be true for the
MERCOSUR.162
2. MERCOSUR
The MERCOSUR is a framework that provides guidelines for a common
market in the Cono Sur of Latin America, which allows for free movement in
goods, services, and capital, much like the Treaty of Rome provided for the
European Union.163 With an institutional structure more robust than the
NAFTA, the administrative capacity is in the Council and the Common
Market Group, with the Council having the ‘political leadership’ to act dip-
lomatically on behalf of the MERCOSUR countries on trade issues.164 The
Common Market Group implements the Council’s decision, monitors com-
pliance, and proposes measures and work programs to enhance trade liber-
alization.165 It has an ‘executive’ function, consisting of members of the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Economy, and Central Banks of the
Members.166 It also has as part of its structure the Commerce
Commission of MERCOSUR, the Joint Parliamentary Commission, and
the Consulting Economic Social Forum.167 Working groups work on specific
areas such as fiscal and monetary policy, agriculture, and energy policy to
coordinate policies. Decisions by the Council or the Common Market Group
must be approved by the individual members.168 Despite little institutional
activity, MERCOSUR was an important catalyst in promoting trade among
its members, increasing trade among them by 250% from 1991 to 1995.169
With respect to the environment, the MERCOSUR does contain a frame-
work for dealing with issues concerning the environment, sustainability, and
161 See NAAEC, above n 147, Articles 34, 36, and Annex 34.
162 See below Section IV.C.2.
163 See Raj Bhala and Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law x 2–5(b)(1)(A). The MERCOSUR does
not include free movement of labor and people as in the EU. Members of MERCOSUR
include Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with Chile and Bolivia associated mem-
bers. Venezuela became the newest member of MERCOSUR in 2006. See Protocolo de
Adesa˜o da Repu´blica Bolivariana da Venezuela ao Mercosul, available at http://www.merco-
sur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm.
164 Treaty of Asuncio´n, Chapter II, Articles 9–10.
165 See Ibid Article 13.
166 See Ibid Article 14.
167 Raquel Aguero, ‘Environmental Legislation in MERCOSUR’ at 114, in 1st International
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Latin America.
168 See Bhala and Kennedy, above n 163 at x 2–5(b)(1)(G).
169 Trade increased from $4 billion in 1990 to more than $14 billion in 1995. See id at x
2–5(b)(1)(B).
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energy. The Treaty of Asuncio´n lays out as one of its objectives the efficient
use of its natural resources and the preservation of the environment.170 The
Canela Declaration committed the heads of states of the MERCOSUR
members to share the responsibility in dealing with environmental
issues.171 The Protocol of Ouro Preto allows for public participation from
public and private sectors, including those connected to the environment.
Primarily through the work of the Subgroup No. 6 of Environment, and
resolutions/directives passed by the Common Market Group, several legal
instruments within the MERCOSUR provide for internal dialogical inter-
faces between trade and the environment. For example, the Council and
Common Market Group passed resolutions involving pesticides, energy
policies, and hazardous products that eventually led to the formation of an
informal working group to study environmental laws and standards in the
four member countries, resulting in 1994 in the establishment of guidelines
for increasing harmonization of standards, reduction in pollution, fair con-
ditions for commerce, adoption of renewable natural resources, among other
things.172 Directives have attempted to address some of these areas directly,
and establish the importance of environmental sustainability and develop-
ment for the MERCOSUR. In particular, the Resolution 10/94 was clear to
connect the need for the ‘least degree of environmental deterioration in
productive processes and in exchange products . . . .’173 Furthermore, some
directives make compulsory license qualifications and evaluation of environ-
mental impacts for investments.174 The Commission on Environmental
Cooperation, established in 1992,175 works on issues of harmonization of
environmental standards and restrictions to the exploitation of resources,
though no harmonization procedures have been adopted per se. However,
a ‘Procedure for the Analysis and Resolution of the Non-Tariff Measures and
Restrictions’ is part of the MERCOSUR documents.176 Though there is a
GATT Article XX equivalent in the MERCOSUR, there is no similar
170 See Treaty of Asuncio´n, Preamble. For an overview of environmental policies in the
MERCOSUR, see generally Fabio Morosini, ‘The MERCOSUR and WTO Retreaded
Tires Dispute: Rehabilitating Regulatory Competition in International Trade and
Environmental Regulation’, 59–65 (2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-
Inaugural-Conference.html.
171 See Declarac¸a˜o de Canela dos Presidentes dos Paı´ses do Cone Sul Pre´via a` Confereˆncia das
Nac¸o˜es Unidos sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento, available at http://www.mercosur.
int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm.
172 See Resolution 10/94 of the Common Market Group. A summary of these guidelines is in
Aguero, above n 167 at 115.
173 See REMA/Rec 10/94, available in Spanish at http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/3097/
1/secretaria/resoluciones_1994. See also, Aguero, above n 167 at 115.
174 See Aguero, above n 167. See also, GMC Resolution 57/93, available at http://www.merco-
sur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (visited 30 October 2007).
175 Decreto Presidencial No. 2.241, de 2 de junho de 1997, D.O.U. de 03.06.1997 (Brazil),
Article 4.
176 See Ibid at 116.
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chapeau, facilitating adjudicatory discretion as to the legitimacy of national
environmental measures.177 However, Article 50 of the Montevideo Treaty
recognizes that trade measures should not impede domestic regulatory meas-
ures pursuing legitimate objectives, including ‘the protection of the life and
health of persons, animals, and plants’.178
The dialogical aspects of the MERCOSUR, as they pertain to trade and
environment, are found primarily within its administrative capacity, where
the Common Market Group has implemented resolutions dealing with the
environment, and even more so with respect to Phytosanitary measures re-
garding trade in animal and agricultural products.179 One 1994 resolution
even addressed limits by Members on toxic gas emissions from vehicles with
the hope that they would work to harmonize standards in this regard and
require compliance to established emissions standards.180 Furthermore, the
working groups, especially Subgroup No. 6 on the environment, discuss and
implement guidelines for dealing with social issues that intersect with trade
such as sustainable development and preservation of natural resources.
However, less activity has originated from the adjudicatory capacity of the
MERCOSUR, an evolving organ that was more consolidated after the
Protocol of Olivos in 2002.181 This Protocol not only reinforced the dispute
settlement mechanism put in place by the Treaty of Asuncio´n, but also a
Permanent Appellate Tribunal, el Tribunal Permanente de Revisio´n.182 It also
allows Members to choose the WTO dispute settlement body where it has
jurisdiction, much like the NAFTA under Article 2005.183 Though there has
been little MERCOSUR adjudicatory activity on trade and environment, one
does stand out as particularly important for the dialogical interface between
trade and the environment.184 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres will be discussed in more detail in Section IV of this article because it not
only highlights the emerging dialogical aspects resulting from the adjudicatory
177 See Morosini, above n 170, at 61.
178 See Ibid. See also, See Annex I to the Asuncio´n Treaty – Programa de Liberalizac¸a˜o
Comercial, Article 2(b), available at http://www.interlegis.gov.br/processo_legislativo/copy_
of_20020319150524/20030529151030/TRTASS02.HTM#E49E2.
179 See e.g. MERCOSUR/GMC/Res No. 71/1994-62/1994, available in Spanish at http://www.
mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/3097/1/secretaria/resoluciones_1994.
180 See MERCOSUL/GMC/Res. No. 84/94, available in Portuguese at http://www.mercosur.int/
innovaportal/v/3097/1/secretaria/resoluciones_1994. See also, GMC Resolution 9/91, avail-
able at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (visited 30
October 2007).
181 The Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUR, 18 February 2002,
available at 42 ILM 2 (2003).
182 See Ibid, Article 1.
183 See Ibid Article (1)(2).
184 Prior to Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, there was one case before the
MERCOSUR Permanent Appellate Tribunal that dealt with a Brazilian phytosanitary meas-
ure on imports from Argentina. For more on this case, see generally Morosini, above n 169
at 66–69.
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capacity internal to the MERCOSUR and its ability to cross-fertilize trade and
environment issues within its own MERCOSUR trade jurisprudence, but
it also demonstrates the impact that overlapping multilateral and regional
regimes may have in the convergence of trade and environmental issues.185
While PTAs that incorporate adjudicatory and administrative capacities in
order to manage trade and environment concerns create opportunity for
regional and bilateral cooperation and coordination in this area, they also
enhance fragmentation and uncertainty as to the ability of regional partners
to create environmental policy regionally rather than multilaterally.
Furthermore, PTA’s represent new fora through which states may bring
disputes concerning issues of trade and environment.186 There is little guid-
ance as to the relationship between the multilateral and regional regimes in
this context. While such fragmentation may create opportunities for more
dialogue and negotiation, it also increases ambiguity, pushing trade and en-
vironmental issues onto the international sphere of inter-systemic interac-
tions and processes and away from local governance and citizen
participation. This dynamic, however, further contributes the cross-fertiliza-
tion of trade and environmental issues, resulting in dialogical effects.
V. DIALOGICAL EFFECTS OF FRAGMENTATION
There can be more than one trade regime under which a regulation may be
adjudicated. As already discussed, several PTAs may address issues of the
environment when dealing with trade. While the WTO agreements seem to
recognize that environmental regulations may come under its Covered
Agreements like the GATT, the TBT, and SPS Agreements, there is no multi-
lateral trade framework that formally deals with environmental issues. On the
other hand, as discussed, many PTAs do address issues of trade and the
environment in formal ways, though to varying degrees. However, many
also allow parties to choose whether to adjudicate disputes under the regional
agreement or the WTO, as seen in NAFTA and MERCOSUR for example.
As a result, jurisdictional overlaps arise as disputing parties strategically choose
whether to bring a trade dispute under a regional tribunal or the WTO DSB.
Having the option to adjudicate regional environmental disputes at the multi-
lateral level is in part a strategic choice for relevant parties, because of the
political weight of the WTO. Furthermore, other interested WTO members
may submit briefs.187 Trade and non-trade interests may converge when
185 See below Section V.A.
186 Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Ribeiro Salles, ‘Forum Shopping Before International
Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions’, 42 Cornell International Law Journal
77 (2009).
187 Hansel T. Pham, ‘Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in
the DSU’, 9 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 331 (2004), at 345.
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different international adjudicatory regimes have jurisdiction for related issues,
such as in the well-known Chile-Swordfish case submitted both to the WTO
and the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).188
At times, this kind of interface may illuminate overlapping interests be-
tween seemingly different sets of policy; such as, the environmental and trade
interests. Other times, it may demonstrate the overlapping interests of private
and public actors and the ways in which they interact within the various
regimes in the international sphere.189 As a procedural matter, though,
these types of cases take the form of overlapping fora through which com-
plainants may bring a trade (or investment) dispute.
Adjudicatory overlaps may exist between private rights of action under the
investor–state arbitration context and public rights of action under the
trade.190 For example, Corn Products International v United Mexican States,
involving a US investor with the largest market share in high fructose corn
syrup (HFCS) in Mexico, was a Chapter 11 investor-state dispute against
the Mexican government for passing a tax on soda bottlers using HFCS.191
There was no comparable tax for users of sugar. In 2004, the US govern-
ment brought Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages before
the WTO, alleging that this tax was protectionist and in violation of national
treatment provisions under the GATT.192 Mexico argued that the case
needed to be resolved under the NAFTA since Mexico had already tried
to convene a Chapter 20 NAFTA panel regarding the issue. However, the
WTO panel reasoned that it had jurisdiction over such matters and ignored
the reference to NAFTA, and then proceeded to find Mexico’s tax in viola-
tion of its trade obligations under the GATT. The NAFTA investor–state
188 Chile – Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, Request for Consultations
by the European Communities, WTO/WT/DS193/1, April 26, 2000 (hereinafter, Chile –
Swordfish). See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case concerning the
Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific
Ocean, Constitution of Chamber, Order 2000/3, 20 December 2000, para 2.
189 Elizabeth Trujillo, ‘From Here to Beijing: Public/Private Overlaps in Trade and Their Effects
on U.S. Law’, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 691 (2009).
190 See Ibid.
191 Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, Corn Products International v United
Mexican States 21 October 2003 (hereinafter Corn Products International).
192 Request for the Establishment on a Panel by the United States, Mexico – Tax Measures on
Soft Drinks and other Beverages, WT/DS308/R, adopted on 24 March 2006 (hereinafter
Mexico– Tax Measures). Earlier antidumping disputes involving corn products had concluded
in NAFTA Chapter 19 trade panel and WTO Appellate Body finding Mexico in violation of
its trade obligations under their respective agreements. See Mexico-Anti-dumping Investigation
of High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States, WT/DS132/R (28 January 2000) (adopted
25 February 2000); NAFTA Chapter 19 Tribunal in Review of the Final Determination of
the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Originating from
the United States of America, Mex. U.S. 98-1904-01 (3 August 2001) (hereinafter Imports
of High Fructose Corn Syrup).
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tribunal finally decided against Mexico and awarded the US investor, Corn
Products International, $58.4 million from the government of Mexico.193
This was finally paid in January 2011.194
The sugar disputes between the USA and Mexico illustrate that public
rights of action under trade may collide with private rights of action under
investment regimes.195 These jurisdictional overlaps, where private investors
bring an investment dispute against a state at the regional level and almost
simultaneously the state of the investor will bring a trade dispute with similar
questions as the investment dispute for adjudication under a WTO panel,
create opportunities for heightened conflict and as a result, for subsequent
dialogue and negotiation.196 In 2006, the USA and Mexico reached a
NAFTA sugar agreement where the USA promised to increase market
share of Mexican sugar into the USA and Mexico would eliminate tariffs
on US HFCS.197 The agreement also called for the removal of all barriers in
sugar and sweetener trade between the two countries by 1 January 2008.198
Though this sugar dispute does not directly implicate environmental issues,
it highlights the dialogical impact that fragmentation of investment and trade
regimes may have when various public and private interests collide within a
fragmented inter-systemic international landscape.
The public/private adjudicatory overlaps have important implications for
regulation, particularly if similar parties are involved in the trade and the
investment dispute, both being brought around the same time, and where
substantive legal issues may overlap, as in the case in the NAFTA and WTO
cases involving HFCS.199 Despite jurisdictional fragmentation as a result of
multiple fora, jurisdictional clashes may also enhance opportunities for dia-
logue and regulatory bargaining among states regarding the domestic regu-
latory measures that will be tolerated vis-a`-vis their trade obligations.200
193 Corn Products International v United Mexican States, 15 January 2008, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/01.
194 See ‘News Highlights’ for Corn Products International, 26 January 2011, available at http://
www.cornproducts.com/newsroom/news_highlights/corn_products_receives_584_million_
related_to_nafta_tribunal_judgment/.
195 See generally, Trujillo, From Here to Beijing supra note 189 (discussing vertical and horizontal
overlaps among public and private rights of action).
196 See Ibid.
197 See Ana Leroy and James J. Shea, ‘United State and Mexico Strike NAFTA Sugar
Agreement’, North American Free Trade and Investment Report, 15 August 2006.
198 See Magda Kornis, ‘U.S. Corn Sweeteners and Mexican Sugar: Agreement at Last’, U.S.
ITC Journal of International Commerce and Economics, December 2006.
199 See Mexico – Tax Measures, above n 192; See also Corn Products International, above n 193.
For general discussion regarding the jurisdictional and substantive overlaps among trade and
investment regimes, see Trujillo, From Here to Beijing supra note 189.
200 Kal Raustiala and David. G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, 58
International Organizations (2004), at 277310. Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal
Pluralism’, 80 Southern California Law Review 1155 (2007).
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A. Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
It is unclear how trade tribunals deal with issues where both a regional
tribunal and the multilateral one have jurisdiction. For the most part, the
way that the WTO panels have addressed this issue is to hear cases where the
WTO has jurisdiction, ignoring the question of whether the dispute should
be heard at the regional level as was done in Mexico – Tax Measures.201
However, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres explicitly
dealt with a decision from a regional tribunal concerning a local regulation
for recycled products, ruling that the regional tribunal decision was in vio-
lation of the WTO rules.202 This case illustrates that, despite the fragmen-
tation, the overlapping trade regimes may in fact converge on trade and
environment issues and result in a top-down adjudication concerning a
decision by a regional trade tribunal.
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres was the first WTO case dealing with recycled waste
products. The EU initially brought this case claiming that Brazil’s ban and
penalties on retreaded tire imports from non-MERCOSUR countries
amounted to a trade restriction prohibited under GATT Articles XI and
Article III. Brazil had passed the measure in accordance with a
MERCOSUR exemption for the ban. The MERCOSUR panel decision
had recognized the commitment by Members to the environment and
found that such a ban could be justified as pursuing a legitimate environ-
mental objective.203 In particular, it accepted that the precautionary prin-
ciple could justify such measures in certain cases. However, the
MERCOSUR Appellate Body Tribunal ultimately disagreed with the Panel
decision and found the measure to be trade restrictive, opining that the
alleged environmental harm was not serious enough and that the measure
did not meet the environmental objectives.204 Interestingly, the Appellate
Body Tribunal showed the same reserve as WTO bodies in supporting the
precautionary principle, ruling on the side of free trade and articulating that
it was the foundation principle of free trade that primarily governed the
MERCOSUR.205
In the WTO case, Brazil claimed that the ban was justified under Article
XX(b) of the GATT because it was ‘necessary’ in order to protect human,
animal and/or plant life or health. It used a balancing test to weigh 1) Brazil’s
objectives to prevent life-threatening diseases brought on by the accumula-
tion of waste tires in the waste sites, 2) the relative nexus of this policy to
achieve those objectives, and 3) the degree to which the measure restricted
201 See e.g. Mexico – Tax Measures above n 192. See also Trujllo, above n 80.
202 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R (2007) (hereinafter
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres AB Report)
203 See Morosini, above n 170, at 91. See also Montevideo Treaty, Article 50(d) (1980).
204 See Argentina Appellate Body Report, para 17.
205 See Morosini, above n 170, at 87–88.
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trade.206 Although the WTO panel found that the measure was in violation
of GATT Article XI:1 and Article III, it analyzed the viability of the measure
under Article XX more narrowly. The Panel found that this import ban was
a legitimate regulation that pursued the protection of human, animal or plant
life and was necessary to fulfill Brazil’s objectives.207 Though the Panel ul-
timately found the measure trade restrictive, the Panel also found the envir-
onmental measure necessary to further Brazil’s objective. However, it
decided that the measure was applied in a discriminatory fashion.208 In
line with previous jurisprudence, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s
narrow application of Article XX’s chapeau and found the ban to be arbitrary
and unjustifiable, and not the least restrictive means of pursuing the envir-
onmental objective.209 Furthermore, it did not find the measure justified
under Article XX(b).
This case not only had implications for WTO treatment of regional envir-
onmental regulations, it also showed the willingness of recent WTO panels to
consider environmental regulations at the regional level and the viability of
decisions by regional tribunals under the GATT. Though ultimately not
upholding the measure, it was significant that a WTO panel actually recog-
nized that the measure was not arbitrary or discriminatory per se and that
it was legitimate in furthering Brazil’s environmental objective.210 Arguably,
the MERCOSUR Appellate Body Tribunal was even less sympathetic to the
environmental concerns than the WTO panel, which went to great lengths to
justify the environmental objectives of Brazil’s ban.211 Overall, though, it was
a bold WTO decision. First, it was the first WTO case dealing with recycled
waste products. Second, it considered whether a regional tribunal’s assess-
ment of an environmental measure; namely the exception under
MERCOSUR, could be justified under Article XX. Third, it illustrated
the use of judicial discretion by WTO dispute settlement bodies which,
though the Appellate Body ultimately found the exception invalid under
the Article XX chapeau, the Panel did indeed find it to be a necessary
regulation to further Brazil’s environmental objective.
Brazil-Retreaded Tyres contains several dialogical elements. It shows
the cross-fertilization of trade and environmental issues within the
MERCOSUR. First the work of the MERCOSUR adjudicatory processes
balances trade goals with those of protecting the environment, thereby cross-
fertilizing the two domains. The willingness of the MERCOSUR panel to
consider the precautionary principle in justifying an environmental regulation
206 See Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R (12
June 2007) (hereinafter Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Panel Report).
207 See Ibid, para 3.
208 See Ibid, para 7.355.
209 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres AB Report, above n 202, paras 224–34.
210 See Ibid, at para 3, 7.215. The Appellate Body disagreed with this analysis.
211 See Morosini, above n 170 at 112.
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under the trade agreement demonstrates such cross-fertilization. Second, the
administrative capacity of the MERCOSUR, in passing resolutions and
guidelines regarding environmental measures, has demonstrated a formal
cross-fertilization and expansion of this regional trade regime into the envir-
onmental. Finally, the fragmentary nature of trade regimes allowed for the
MERCOSUR case to confront the multilateral sphere through a WTO ad-
judication in Brazil-Recycled Tyres. This case illustrated the multiple centers
for decision-making that exist for issues concerning trade and the environ-
ment. Furthermore, these multiple centers converged within the adjudicatory
capacity of the WTO in a top-down ruling that has impact on the relation-
ship of WTO and regional trade regimes and on the trade and environmental
interface.
B. Overlapping public and private regimes
Within the NAFTA, and other subsequent PTAs, there are protections for
investors of the members of those agreements. Effectively, the ability of in-
vestors of trading partners to bring an investor-state dispute brings private
rights within the parameters of a trade agreement, a public regime involving
the trading rights of states. This phenomenon has allowed for overlaps of
public rights of action and private rights of action on similar substantive
issues.212 It also creates opportunities for cross-fertilization of trade and en-
vironment issues. To better understand the cross-fertilization of trade and
environment, investor-state regimes (especially those found in trade agree-
ments) should be seen as part of this dynamic, rather than as a regime that
functions in isolation of legal measures to increase trade compliance.
Corn Products International v United Mexican States, as discussed above,
illustrated the overlapping public and private regime phenomena where
heightened conflict through multiple fora may result in cross-fertilization of
trade and domestic regulatory issues and culminate in negotiation.213
Other NAFTA investor-state disputes, however, have dealt with environmen-
tal regulations.214 Not all, though, have parallel trade disputes on related
issues.
212 See Trujillo, From Here to Beijing supra note 189.
213 See above Section V.
214 See e.g. S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (hereinafter S.D. Myers);
Ethyl Corp. v Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib 24 June 1998) (hereinafter
Ethyl Corp); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 26
June 2000) (hereinafter Pope & Talbot); Methanex Corp. v United States, Final Award of the
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 3 August 2005), (herein-
after Methanex) available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51051.pdf; Glamis
Gold, Ltd. v United States, Final Arbitral Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 8 June 2009)
(hereinafter Glamis Gold), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm.
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S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, an early Chapter 11 NAFTA case, involved an
U.S. corporation treating Canadian polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) waste
through its Canadian subsidiary, which brought the dispute after Canada
passed a regulation prohibiting the PCB exports.215 The claimant won the
case under a national treatment argument, arguing that the Canadian envir-
onmental regulation discriminated against the US investor. Interestingly, the
NAFTA tribunal looked to WTO interpretations of ‘like products’ to inter-
pret the ‘like circumstances’ language under Article 1102 of the NAFTA,
though it was much more willing to consider the legitimacy of the measure
with respect to Canadian environmental objectives.216 Though there was not
a comparable trade dispute on the issue, this case did alert the environmental
community on the impact that NAFTA, through its investment chapter,
could have on domestic environmental regulation. Pope and Talbot v
Canada,217 on the other hand, involved an investor–state dispute where a
US investor in the Canadian softwood lumber business alleged Chapter 11
violations due to a Canadian export ban on softwood lumber. This case was
happening against the backdrop of a 1996 US–Canadian Softwood Lumber
Agreement and NAFTA Chapter 19 and WTO subsidies disputes concern-
ing Canadian softwood lumber subsidies. Furthermore, in 2004, several
Canadian investors initiated investor–state disputes under NAFTA against
the US government for passing countervailing duties on softwood lumber
imports.218 The ‘Softwood Lumber cases’ illustrate that trade and invest-
ment disputes on similar issues involving related parties intersect in ways that
ultimately lead toward bilateral negotiated agreements that bring together
trade and environmental issues.219
The 2009 NAFTA investor–state dispute, Glamis Gold, Ltd v United
State,220 would converge trade, investment, and environmental issues with
the rights of indigenous peoples. Glamis Gold involved a Canadian investor
(Glamis) who submitted a proposal to mine on Federal land in southeastern
California which was also designated as Native American lands, known as
Indian Pass in the California Desert Conservation Area. Around the same
time, California passed a law and regulations requiring the backfill of all
mine pits, which would have required Glamis to refill the open pit it created.
The purpose of the California law was to meet the state’s environmental and
cultural preservation objectives. Glamis alleged that this law amounted to
expropriation of its investment under NAFTA and sued the US government
215 S.D. Myers, Ibid.
216 See Trujillo, Mission Possible, above n 80.
217 Pope & Talbot, above n 215.
218 Order for the Termination of the Arbitral Proceedings with Respect to Tembec et al. (NAFTA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 10 January 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
68085.pdf.
219 See also Methanex, above n 215.
220 Glamis Gold, above n 215.
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for the value of its mining claim.221 After close review of the state regulations
and the federal government’s responses, the NAFTA tribunal decided against
the investor in this case. However, it also elaborated on the importance of
recognizing the narrow jurisdiction it had in deciding this case that touched
not only upon environmental issues, but also on those of cultural and indi-
genous people’s rights and private versus public rights to property.222 Glamis
Gold not only brought environmental issues into the domain of investment
within a regional trade agreement, it also highlighted the close relationship
among trade, investment, environmental protection with those of human
rights through cultural protection and indigenous peoples rights. More
recently, Lone Pine Resources Inc., a US investor in hydraulic-fracturing,
brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state claim against Canada for
Quebec’s moratorium on exploration of oil and gas under the St Lawrence
River until an environmental impact assessment was done on the effects of
hydraulic-fracturing in the region.223 This case highlights the convergence
among varied stakeholders in the context of energy investment projects and
domestic regulatory action intended to address environmental impact con-
cerns and increases the dialogical effects of fragmentation among investment,
trade, and domestic governance structures.
C. Trade and non-trade adjudicatory overlaps: WTO and UNCLOS
As globalization has taken hold and economies have grown, concerns for the
environment have only increased. The environmental community has re-
sponded by advocating for the negotiation of MEAs. There are over 250
MEAs.224 The question of whether a measure under an MEA could be
brought to the WTO has not been resolved. The case that first raised this
possibility was Chile – Swordfish case which was submitted both to the WTO
and the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).225
Chile – Swordfish began as a result of Chilean legislation for conservation of
swordfish, which prohibited the unloading and transit of swordfish catches in
Chilean ports.226 This affected European vessels fishing for swordfish on the
221 See Ibid, at para 11. The claimant also alleged violations of fair and equitable treatment
under Article 1105 NAFTA, claiming that the federal government wrongfully delayed con-
sideration of its proposed project. See Ibid, para 537.
222 See Ibid, at paras 8–9.
223 Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, November
8, 2012, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/-
topics-domaines/disp-diff/lone.aspx?lang=eng.
224 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm.
225 Chile – Swordfish, above n 188.
226 See Peter-Tobias Stoll and Silja Voneky, ‘The Swordfish Case: Law of the Sea v. Trade’,
Max Planck-Institut fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (2002), available at
http://www.zaoerv.de, p 22–23. See Ley General de Pesca y Agricultura de Chile, articulo
165.
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high seas near Chile. The EU claimed that the Chilean laws violated freedom
of transit rules and limits on quantitative restrictions on imports under the
GATT.227 Under the UNCLOS, Chile argued that bringing the case before
the WTO violated UNCLOS and that its actions were allowed under
UNCLOS’s provisions allowing Coastal States to protect and conserve mi-
gratory species such as Swordfish.228 The EU alleged that Chile’s unilateral
legislation violated their right under UNCLOS to fish on the high seas.229
The EU’s interest in access to Chilean ports was in large part driven by the
EU’s interest in having better access in the re-export of swordfish to the
NAFTA markets, in particular the USA.230
In 2001, the parties to the case informed the WTO that they had come to
a provisional agreement on the dispute and were suspending further
action.231 Furthermore, the UNCLOS Tribunal, by agreement of the par-
ties, discontinued its proceedings for this case and eliminated it from its list
of cases.232 Whether the Chilean legislation was compatible with UNCLOS
or WTO law remains uncertain.233 However, this case illustrated the delicate
relationship between promoting access to trade and policies geared toward
conservation of natural resources, especially when those measures are imple-
mented unilaterally by states. Furthermore, it underscores the use of parallel
jurisdictions.
A dialogical approach to the Chile – Swordfish case highlights that frag-
mentation through parallel jurisdictions, where a dispute may be both within
the scope of international environmental law and trade law, can in fact con-
tribute to the convergence of trade and environmental issues. The ‘conflict’
between these two jurisdictional scopes shifted the issues in this dispute from
litigation to bi-lateral negotiations between Chile and the EU regarding Chilean
port access for swordfish and the creation a multilateral forum for conservation
initiatives for the Southeast Pacific.234 In January 2001, the EU and Chile
reached an ‘amicable settlement’ to end the WTO and UNCLOS disputes
based on primary three pillars: (i) swordfish negotiations would continue
through a Bilateral Scientific and Technical Commission (BSTC) which
227 See GATT Article V, paras 1–3, and XI, para 1.
228 See UNCLOS, Article 64. There seems to be parallel jurisdiction in this case and it is not
clear that the EC was in fact in violation of UNCLOS Article 300 by bringing this case
before the WTO. For more discussion, see Stoll and Voneky, above n 225, at 27.
229 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 87 and Article 116.
230 See Marcos Orellana, ‘The EU and Chile Suspend the Swordfish Case Proceedings at the
WTO and the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea’, ASIL Insights, February 2001,
available at http://www.asil.org/insigh60.cfm.
231 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds193_e.htm.
232 See Ibid.
233 Under GATT law, the Chilean measures would likely be in violation of Articles V and XI,
unless they came under exceptions that could justify the measures under Article XX of
GATT. See GATT Article XX(b) and (g). For more discussion, see Stoll and Voneky,
above n 227, at 28–33.
234 See Orellana, above n 231.
576 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 16(3)
 at Texas A
&
M
 College Station on A
ugust 12, 2016
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
would consider scientific evidence regarding conservation of swordfish, (ii)
Chile would provide EU vessels access to specific Chilean ports within an
agreed program that would also allow for the acquisition of data to be used
by the BSTC in assessing the state of swordfish stocks, and (iii) a commitment
to creating a multilateral framework for dealing with swordfish conservation in
the Southeast Pacific.235 Interestingly, along with the EU Fisheries
Commissioner, Fischler, and Chilean counterparts, the Director-General of
the WTO, Pascal Lamy, played an active role bringing agreement between
the two parties.236 One report states that ‘[t]he settlement strikes a balance
between taking due account of the requirements of the multilateral trade
system and of an effective conservation and management of natural re-
sources’.237 Therefore, the dialogical impact is clear. Not only did the adjudi-
catory capacity of the WTO play an important role, but the administrative
capacity, through the negotiating power of the Secretariat, also was significant
in bringing convergence to the issues of trade and sustainability.238
VI. TRADE COMPLIANCE, REGULATION, AND ‘GREENING’ STRATEGIES
Because of climate change concerns, it is increasingly more difficult to dis-
cuss the trade and environment relationship without also addressing sustain-
ability issues and the push towards green economic growth. While the
administrative and adjudicatory functions of the WTO grapple with the
ways in which trade jurisprudence may better accommodate for domestic
policies intended to address climate change concerns, the UNEP and
other UN organizations are engaging in multilateral dialogue to develop
strategies for sustainable development.
The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
(Rio + 20) focused on sustainable development, launching a process to de-
velop a set of Sustainable Development Goals and adopting guidelines of
235 See EU and Chile Settle WTO/ITLOS Swordfish Dispute, European Union @ United Nations
Partnership in Action, available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org.
236 See Letter from the European Union, 22 June 2010, Official Journal of the European
Union, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:155:
0010:0018:EN:PDF; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:
155:0003:0009:EN:PDF. See also, Summary of Treaty, EU Treaties Office Database, avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGene
ralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=8562. In 2010, the EU and Chile agreed that
an Exchange of Letters would serve as an ‘Understanding concerning the Conservation of
Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean’, replacing the Provisional Agreement
they had signed in 2001. This Understanding confirmed many of the original initiatives
under the Provisional Agreement, but also froze the swordfish fishing levels to the levels
in 2008 or ‘at the maximum historical peak’ and invited outside observers with a legitimate
interest in swordfish conservation to the multilateral consultation efforts.
237 See EU and Chile Settle WTO/ITLOS Swordfish Dispute, above n 236.
238 But note that many environmentalists would take a position that the WTO is not the proper
forum to deal with environmental issues. See e.g. http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/
ENVIRONMENT/.
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green economy policies.239 Furthermore, it recognized the need to work with
other relevant organizations such as the WTO and reaffirmed the right to use
the provisions in TRIPS Agreements, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, and the decision of the WTO General
Council on 30 August 2003 on the implementation of paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. It also re-
affirmed the commitment in the Johannesburg Plan regarding the elimination
of subsidies that contribute to illegal and unregulated fishing and overcap-
acity.240 Participants in Rio + 20 also urged the completion of the Doha
Development Agenda in a balanced way and, ‘with a view to strengthening
the multilateral trading system’.241 Participants included 193 countries, busi-
nesses and civil society partners. In the outcome document, participants
elaborated the ways in which green economy policies can be a tool to advan-
cing sustainable development. Furthermore, it addressed the ways in which
energy is relevant to sustainability.242 They also adopted a 10-year frame-
work on a Program for sustainable consumption and production.243
Though Rio + 20 resulted in voluntary commitments to put sustainable
development into action, specifics and the means to enforce these commit-
ments were lacking. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Summit was to
move the dialogue forward, bringing together many stakeholders as well as
developed and developing countries. Furthermore, it formally linked eco-
nomic development with sustainable development; which in turn, may influ-
ence the way trade regimes will deal with environmental policies affecting
trade compliance, as the Rio + 20 Outcome Document suggests.
While there is no specific definition of a green economy, the UNEP pro-
vides a holistic understanding that a green economy ‘results in improved
human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmen-
tal risks and ecological scarcities.’244 Therefore, principles of a green econ-
omy are closely tied to economic development, as reflected in the 2000
Millennium Goals.245 However, main indicators for economic growth;
namely, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), traditionally have not accounted
for environmental externalities.246 Rio + 20 acknowledged in a draft
239 See Future We Want: Outcome Document, available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/in
dex.php?menu=1298.
240 Ibid paras 78, 142, and 173.
241 Ibid para 282.
242 Ibid paras 125–29.
243 Ibid paras 224–26.
244 UNEP 2010, ‘What is the ‘Green Economy’?’ available at http://www.unep.org/greenecon-
omy/AboutGEI/WhatisGEI/tabid/29784/Default.aspx.
245 See United Nations, Millenium Development Goals Indicators, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/md
g/host.aspx?Content=indicators/officiallist.htm (15 January 2008). See generally, Amartya
Sen, Development as Freedom (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
246 See UNEP 2011 Report, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and
Poverty Eradication, para 1.2.
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document that gross domestic product (GDP) is not a comprehensive way of
assessing a country’s development if it does not include the state of the
environment. However, developing countries, which are the most impacted
both by climate change and by environmental regulations that can affect
their market accessibility, are hesitant to agree to any policy of sustainability
that would stunt their economic growth. These concerns were reflected in
the TBT trade negotiating history when a 1995 WTO Secretariat note con-
cluded that many of the negotiating nations, for example Mexico, ‘were of
the view that standards based inter alia on PPM’s unrelated to a product’s
characteristics should not be considered eligible for being treated as in con-
formity with the TBT Agreement.’247 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 31 of
the Doha Agenda, negotiators attempted to eliminate tariff and non-tariff
barriers on environmental goods and services (EGS); however, they
struggled to agree on what products constituted EGS.248 Developing coun-
tries, in particular, were concerned with PPM-based environmental goods.249
As labeling becomes one way to incentivize green production methods, it will
become increasingly important for trade regimes to address trade compliance
issues of PPM-based environmental goods.
Labeling schemes are examples of less formal regulatory norms, deriving
both from public and private networks, many of which are transnational and
adopted through industry practice and/or free market forces.250 In this new
form of regulation, NGOs and private actors are working with intergovern-
mental organizations and governments to help create and monitor such
standards.251 Eco-labels, for example, identify the product’s impact on the
environment based on the life cycle of the product and provide information
to consumers about the relative environmental quality of a product. Several
eco-labeling schemes, both public and private and even public/private regu-
latory schemes, turn to the international global standards of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and Global Eco-labeling network for
guidance. The ISO, like the Codex Alimentarius Commission, was estab-
lished through the WTO to help set harmonized standards for creating
247 Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with Regard to
Labeling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to
Product Characteristics,  3(c), WT/CTE/W/11 (Aug. 29, 1995) (further analysis in  103–
51). See also Section III.B.1 for a discussion on PPM’s.
248 See Mahesh Sugathan, ‘A Doha Round Deliverable for Climate Change?’, 1(2) Bridges
Trade BioRes Review, Vol 1, No. 2 (Dec. 2007).
249 See Gae¨lle Balineau and Jaime de Melo, Stalemate at the Negotiations on Environmental
Goods and Services at the Doha Round, at 7–8 October 2011 working draft, available at
http://www.ferdi.fr/uploads/sfCmsContent/html/112/P28.pdf.
250 See Koh, above n 28.
251 For example, Rainforest Alliance, the Brazilian IMAFLORA, and the Brazilian coffee indus-
try association, ABIC, are working together to certify Brazilian coffee as ‘sustainable’, using
the Rainforest Alliance Certified seal. See The Rainforest Alliance and IMAFLORA Join
Forces with Brazilian Coffee Industry, 23 November 2009, available at http://www.rainfor
estalliance.org/newsroom/news/imafloraabic.
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environmentally safe products and food standards in the case of Codex.
Governments may look to their own national standards or international
standards such as ISO to set up their own criteria. For example, the
German Blue Angel label, state created and monitored, is a voluntary label
and applies to consumer products and services, following the international
standards found under the ISO and Global Ecolabeling Network.252 The
Blue Angel label has become so standard and prestigious that it has con-
tributed to changing consumer behavior and the German Federal
Environment Agency has monitored these changes and incorporated them
into established requirements and test methods for products. By public and
private regulatory bodies adopting these global standards in their labeling
schemes, global norms can trickle down toward the domestic and become
transnational.253
This less formalized means of cross-fertilizing trade and environmental
standards is perhaps the most organic and evolving in recent WTO jurispru-
dence since WTO panels tend to look to international standards for guidance
when adjudicating domestic regulatory measures.254 The changing regula-
tory landscape has distinguishing features for future WTO adjudication of
regulatory measures: (i) transnational and global regulatory norms are con-
verging and the state plays a less important role in their creation and en-
forcement,255 and (ii) the WTO preference for multilateral actions and
harmonization of international standards, rather than unilateral actions by
states may result in transnational regulatory norms increasingly becoming
more formalized (or not) into the global system.256
Furthermore, recent preferential trade agreements are encouraging volun-
tary regulatory norms that are both market-driven and transnational. The
Central American Free Trade Agreement,257 which contains a chapter on
the environment, recognizes that environmental policy may be encouraged
252 Blue Angel follows ISO 14020, 140211, 14022, 14025. See http://www.blauer-engel.de/en/
blauer_engel/index.php.
253 Greg Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportunities and
Constraints’, NYU IILJ working paper 2010/4, available at http://iilj.org/publications/
2010WorkingPapers.asp (visited 14 July 2013). (distinguishing between global law which
are ‘universal norms [that] are created and diffused globally in different legal domains’
and transnational law which ‘comprises legal norms that cross borders and thus apply to
parties located in more than one jurisdiction’.).
254 US – Tuna II AB Report, above n 23 paras 350–352;359; 379.
255 See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation
through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’, 42
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2 (2009) (discussing the ‘Transnational
Governance Model’ where private actors and civil society, rather than the state, take on
an increased role in setting and enforcing regulatory standards).
256 See e.g. US–Tuna II AB Report, above n 23, paras 384–386; 390.392,394; 396–399; 401
(deciding that AIDCP was not an international organization recognized for setting interna-
tional standards). See SPS Agreement, Article 3; TBT Agreement, Article 2.4.
257 Central American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, 2006 U.S.T. LEXIS 119, 51 I.L.M.
1226, [hereinafter CAFTA].
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and best implemented by private entities and so encourages the establish-
ment of voluntary mechanisms through businesses, local communities, and
non-governmental organizations in order to improve environmental perform-
ance.258 The recent US-Peru Free Trade Agreement also encourages similar
market-based voluntary mechanisms.259
As regulatory paradigms shift and consumers become more aware of sustain-
ability concerns, traditional notions of what constitutes economic development
need to be reevaluated. Adjustments will have to be made not only to the
methods of measuring economic development to account for environmental
externalities, but also to current economic structures so as to shift production
methods and consumption patterns toward ‘green’ results.260 Such adjustments
have trade-offs both for the developed and developing countries. Though many
developing countries are concerned that such adjustments can translate into
protectionist measures that impede their ability to have access to markets, other
emerging economies like China and Brazil are at the forefront of green technol-
ogies.261 Though much of the discourse for trade and sustainability has been on
the need to develop renewable resources as energy demands increase and find
‘cleaner’ inputs to production processes, issues around food security, agricul-
ture, and timber taint optimism for the increased use of renewable resources.262
Striking a balance between legitimate regulatory measures intended to in-
centivize green growth versus those intended to protect domestic markets is
no easy task. Trade regimes are arguably designed to deal with these chal-
lenges, through the narrow lens of the provisions in the GATT and related
Covered Agreements that address non-tariff barriers. Whether they can serve
as governance mechanisms for managing ‘green trade’ is less clear, especially
if regulation shifts from governments to the private sector or a public/private
hybrid. At the 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos, WTO Director-
General stated that the environmental sustainability issue was not being ad-
equately addressed: ‘On the environment, we are moving this planet back-
wards in terms of well-being, and that’s why I think the environment should
258 Ibid, Chapter 17.
259 See Article 18.5 US-Peru Free Trade Agreement.
260 See Report by a Panel of Experts to Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, ‘The Transition to a Green Economy:
Benefits, Challenges and Risks from a Sustainable Development Perspective’ by Jose´
Antonio Ocampo at p 7, available at http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/docu
ments/research_products/UN-DESA,%20UNCTAD%20Transition%20GE.pdf.
261 See World Bank Supporting Report 3, ‘Seizing the Opportunity of Green Development in
China’, available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SR3–229-
292.pdf. See also Shai Oster, ‘World’s Top Polluter Emerges as Green-Technology
Leader’, The Wall Street Journal, 15 December 2009. Approximately 46% of Brazil’s primary
energy production is from renewable energy. See Balanc¸o Energe´tico Nacional ano base 2011
from the Brazilian Ministry of Mining and Energy, available at https://ben.epe.gov.br/down
loads/Relatorio_Final_BEN_2012.pdf.
262 See 2010 World Trade Report: Trade in Natural Resources, at 97–105 and 183–91, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_e.htm.
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be a priority.’263 Though questions remain as to the extent that trade regimes
can and should play in the push towards environmental sustainability, trade
regimes have increasingly become a part of the strategies for green economic
growth, further highlighting that environmental norms will continue to con-
verge with trade ones.
VII. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM USING A DIALOGICAL APPROACH
The relationship of trade to the environment and the way in which important
‘linkages’ have been established over time between the two camps is not new.
Others have written on the importance of the administrative capacity of the
WTO and the challenges of expanding the adjudicatory capacity of the WTO
beyond trade matters.264 Less has been written on the dialogical aspects of
the internal dynamics of the adjudicatory and administrative capacities of
trade regimes and of the impact that fragmentation has in enhancing
cross-fertilization between trade and environmental issues. This article as-
pires to fill that gap. Furthermore, it illustrates that such convergence can
also shape trade law and influence the sustainable development discourse, as
is evidenced in the Rio + 20 Outcome Document. The interfaces span beyond
the internal structures of the trade regime, even if much of the convergence
has taken place within the regime itself. The interaction among various re-
gimes has important implications for the ways in which trade and environ-
mental concerns overlap. Collision among jurisdictional domains and legal
norms not only increases fragmentation, but also creates normative space for
dialogue and new visions of the way the relationship among trade and en-
vironmental issues will evolve over time.265 Jurisdictional choices matter as to
how conflicts are settled and how issues concerning trade and environment
are resolved outside the realm of trade. Adjudicatory conflict may lead to
negotiations, the creation of new environmental regimes, and to new mech-
anisms for regulation many of which transform the role of the state into
a ‘manager’ of competing regulatory norms rather than the creator or enfor-
cer of them.266 In addition, these dynamics in and around the institutional
structure of the WTO contributes to the legitimacy of its overall legal frame-
work, allowing trade norms to seep into other non-trade jurisdictional
domains.
263 See World Economic Forum in the ‘Global Agenda Outlook 2013’, p 8, available at http://
www.weforum.org/reports.
264 See e.g. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘The Death of the Trade Regime’, 10 European Journal of
International Law 733 (1999); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘Lotus Eaters: Reflections on the
Varietals Dispute, the SPS Agreement, and the WTO Dispute Resolution’, 1 Health
Regulation in the WTO, 2006.
265 Teubner and Korth, ‘Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism,’ above n 25.
266 See Paul Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, above note 200.
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A dialogical approach to the trade and environment interplay illuminates
three main factors. First, the relationship between the adjudicatory and ad-
ministrative functions of the WTO matters and the two reinforce one an-
other. Each within its own capacity can serve as a catalyst for more dialogue
among trade and environmentalists and may ignite the recognition for new
environmental agreements. The adjudicatory capacity also serves as a legitimiz-
ing tool for the work done within the administrative capacity of the WTO. The
WTOs adjudicatory function and its adherence to the rule of law and capacity to
use judicial discretion in the interpretation of that law can set the course for how
future negotiations in this area will evolve, both within the administrative cap-
acity of the trade regime and outside the WTO itself. Furthermore, through new
interpretations of WTO law and willingness to incorporate non-trade elements
into applying that law, adjudicatory panels are allowing environmental concerns
to ‘seep’ into trade concepts. However, trade norms are also traveling outside
the traditional parameters of the trade regime, as evidenced in some multilateral
environmental agreements and in recent sustainability summits. In this way,
cross fertilization, both inwards and out, is taking hold.
Second, a dialogical approach demonstrates that there are multi-centered
points for convergence for trade and environmental issues. In addition to the
multilateral framework, many of the sources of convergence for trade and the
environment have been regional and domestic. Therefore, the ways in which the
multilateral interacts with the regional and bilateral regimes are important when
considering the trade and environment interplay. Furthermore, the interaction
among trade and non-trade regimes, including investment regimes, is another
means for convergence of trade and environmental issues. This interaction,
though, also raises concerns regarding forum shopping and increased fragmen-
tation. But it is within the collision of various jurisdictional and legal domains
that dialogue and new ways of thinking about the relationship have emerged.267
Finally, fragmentation has rendered the relationship to be organic and less
hierarchical. The adjudicatory processes of the WTO have played an important
role in helping to change the discourse as between the environment and trade
from one that is separated by different normative goals to one that allows for
more convergence. This convergence, though, has also emerged from its ad-
ministrative capacity, allowing for a political forum for broader discourse among
members of the global community regarding trade and sustainable develop-
ment. This process shapes how international environmental law and issues
around sustainability are evolving and ensures that the concerns of trade
remain part of the discourse. In this way, the scope of the trade regime has
267 The author concedes that there are times when disputes do not result in dialogue; however,
such instances should be seen as part of an ongoing, organic process that contributes towards
the emergence of a ‘shared environmental sustainability’ discourse.
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expanded, both by exporting trade rules into other legal domains and by influ-
encing the way trade and non-trade issues converge.268
Key to a dialogical approach to the trade and environment interface is that
the relationship is evolving from several directions, top-down, bottom-up,
horizontal and vertical ways of bringing convergence, and that the state is
not the only primary player in this process.269 The participation of non-state
parties into the trade framework is a significant phenomenon for enhancing
dialogue and cross-fertilization between the camps. The work of NGOs and
standardizing organizations have found their way into trade regimes, both
through their adjudicatory and administrative capacities and in formal and
informal ways. Despite this influence, though, the trade system does have a
strong voice in how environmental regulation is being shaped and in the
changing role of states in establishing and enforcing regulatory norms. If
we can imagine a ‘shared environmental discourse’ emerging, it is one
with an eye toward furthering trade principles and ‘‘green’’ economic
growth, but it is less clear if this in fact better aligns economic development
with environmentally sustainable development principles, despite the ideals
of the Millennium Development goals and the voluntary commitments of
Rio + 20.
Clearly, more understanding and dialogue is needed between the two
camps, both of which are siloed in their jurisdictional scopes and legal frame-
works, but are increasingly becoming more and more linked. Though there is
increased convergence, this should not necessarily be the end goal for a
model of sustainable development. The ways in which the convergence
takes place must be taken into account in order to have clarity on the
values and norms that are shaping current and future policies around sus-
tainability and economic development.
In light of the recent global financial crisis, questions have emerged regarding
the applicability of our current capitalist system in today’s world and whether
other values beyond profit enhancement should also be incorporated into a
market economy.270 In a globalized world of multilateral, regional, bilateral,
and domestic legal frameworks, fragmentation, rather than harmonization, pre-
dominates notions of global governance. Regime and legal fragmentation can
268 See e.g. Energy Charter Treaty, ‘Trade in Energy’, available at http://www.encharter.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/document/WTO_Rules_applying_to_the_ECT_-_2002_-_ENG.pdf.
(WTO rules applying to trade in energy).
269 But see Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, Regime Complex for Climate Change,
Discussion Paper 2010–33, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, January
2010, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Keohane_Victor_Final_2.pdf;
Raustiala and Victor, above n 200.
270 Amartya Sen, ‘Capitalism Beyond the Crisis’, The New York Review of Books (2009),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/mar/26/capitalism-beyond-the-
crisis/?pagination=false (explaining that in his first book, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Adam Smith ‘investigated the strong need for actions based on values that go
beyond profit seeking’.).
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pose new opportunities for dialogue and the creation of transnational norms
that can assist in testing new visions of economic development that are not only
driven by profit enhancing mechanisms and measures of GDP,271 but also
better align the importance of environmental sustainability with that of eco-
nomic development.
271 James M. Cypher and James L. Dietz, The Process of Economic Development (Routledge,
2008), at 31.
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